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CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OP FULL EMPLOYMENT
4.
With the cessation of hostilities the fear of
losing one f s job and hence one's security reappeared.
Americans knew that the end of the war brought about
drastic changes and consequently they wondered how the
impact of peace would affect their lives and their boys 1
lives who have returned to civilian life after fighting
and winning world w ar II. They are wondering, "Will there
be enough ,1obs to go around — .1obs for the boys return-
ing; .1obs for those in war industires? Win I lose my ,1ob? "
The goal for America is full employment — a situation in
which, while there would be a shortage of labor in some
areas or occupations and a surplus of labor in others, the
total of employment opportunities would at least equal the
"1.
total number seeking work and as a rule slightly larger*
Eranklin Roosevelt first set forth, the nation's
goal of 60,000,000 Jobs in his speech at Soldier's Field in
Chicago on October 28, 1944, He gave his pledge that the
government would not shirk its responsibilities to all of
the people, and that pledge 'alone seemed to give people a
new faith in their future,
i; Eulau, H # , New' Republic, September §4, 1945 p. 395
2. Wallace, Henry, "Sixty Million Jobs' , s imon & Scnuster,
New York 1945 p. 3

Franklin Roosevelt's pledge was based on the theory that
the total number of .1ob opportunities depended unon the
total amount spent for goods and services by all of the
consumers, by industry and business, and by government.
Governor Thomas Dewey, in turn, said in one of
his campaign speeches in 1944 * Government 1 s first job in
the peacetime years ahead will be to see that conditions
exist which promote widespread Job opportunities in private
enterprise. If at any time there are not sufficient jobs in
private enterprise to go around, the government can and
must create job opportunities, because there must be Jobs
for all in this country of ours — In the final analysis
the voter is the government and therefore it will be the
"1.
voter who will be responsible for full employment. The
steps to be taken by the government in the years 1946-1948
and the promises to be made by the two parties in the 1948
presidential campaign concerning the fulfillment of full
employment will undoubtedly have great weight on the voter s
decision of the party he will put in power in 1948.
Under conditions of reasonably-full employment
after the war, how many persons would on the average be work-
ing? To answer this question, it will be necessary to take
account of : (a) the growth of the aggregate labor force since
1. Wanace, Henry. Op. Git. p. 35

1940; (b) the number retained in the armed forces; and (c)
the percentage of the labor force which, for one reason or
another, is normally not working.
The total labor force (including both those in
the military services and the civilian labor population)
averages for the year 1940 approximately 54,000,000, The
normal increase in the working polulation has been estimated
at, roughly, 650,000 annually for the six-year period, 1940-
1.
1946. At this rate of growth the total labor force in 1947
would average roughly 58,500,000. Assuming that 1,500,000
are still in the armed services, the available civilian
labor force would thus number 57,000,000 persons.
It should be understood that the labor force covers
workers fourteen years up. Thus it includes over 1,000,000
under eighteen years of age, and over 2,000,000 who are
sixty-five years or over. Included in the annual average
employment figures are several millions who work only a
part of the year — especially in harvest periods and in
other busy seasons such as Christmas holidays. The variation
in the size of the labor force in the course of a year is
as much as 3,000,000 — reaching the peak in the summer
months and the low ebb in the winter season.
1. Livingston, S. Morris, Survey of Current Business,
April 1942
U.S. Department of Commerce pps. 10, 14

A FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT
The overall figure of 57,000,000 persons does not
measure the number of persons who would ordinarily be work-
ing under conditions of reasonably full employment, Even
under what may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory employ-
ment conditions, the number employed is always considerably
less than the total working force, In the boom year 1929,
for example, estimates of the average number unemployed
ranged from 1, BOO, 000 to 3,500,000 out of the total labor
force of roughly 49,000,000, In the summer of 1942 when the
labor market was regarded as tight in many areas the estimate
'1.
number unemployed was about 2,600,000.
Those who are normally not working include • some
who are unemployable; others who are out on account of
prolonged illness; those laid off because of seasonal slack;
those out because of technological changes and depressed
conditions in certain industries; and those in the process
of shifting .1obs.
In a flexible dynamic economy there will inevit-
ably be a considerable percentage of the labor population
out of work at any given time. Part of such unemployment is
involuntary — due to seasonal factors, to shifts in demand,
to technological changes, and to minor trade oscillations,
1, Schlotterbeck, Karl T". , "Postwar Re -Employment", The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D»C. p, 17
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Another portion is voluntary, reflecting the freedom of
individuals to shift jobs and occupations in the light of
opportunities for betterment.
Sir Wiinam Beveridge estimated that in Great
Britain about 8,5 percent ( 1,500, 000 ) of the working popu-
lation, exclusive of unemployable s, would on the average
*1.
not be working. It is difficult to say what percentage of
the labor force in the United States might ordinarily be
out of work. However, if we apply the 8.5 percent rate to
the civilian labor force of the United States, we should
have a figure for those normally out of work amounting to
almost 5,000,000. We are inclined to believe that even
under generally favorable conditions there would perhaps
be out of work on the average over a oeriod of years as
many as 4,000,000. *n the best years — under boom condi-
tions — the level might fall as low as 3,000,000. How-
ever, only when the number out of work exceeds 4,000,000
need the employment situation occasion real concern. *t
is evident then that complete employment of the labor force
would not be consistent with shifting consumer demands,
with the requirements for technological change, and with
freedom of labor to shift .1obs as opportunity for improve-
ment offers. An allowance of 5 to 6 percent is essential
1. Beveridge. William Sir , "The Pillars of Security",
MacMillan C0 ., New York 1943 pps. 111-12
t

1.
for flexibility and freedom.
Therefore, full employment does not mean liter-
ally no unemployment; that is to say, it does not mean
that every man and woman in the country who is fit and
free for work is employed
'
productively on every dav of
'2.
his or her working life. Pull employment is sometimes
defined as "a state of affairs in which the number of un-
filled vacancies is not appreciably below the number of
unemployed persons, so that unemployment at any given
time is due to the normal lag between a person's losing
one ,1ob and finding another. These 2,000,000 persons who
are normally not working even in prosperity years make up
the percentage of the labor market that is called "friction-
'4.
ally unemployed.
B WORKERS WHO WILL LEAVE THE MARKET
The number of persons available for work has been
steadily increasing. The U.S. Census estimates that there
5.
will be over 62,000,000 by 1950, some 18,000,000 more than
6.
were employed in 1939, the year the war began. But the chanc
are that many of the 17,800,000 persons who faced demobiliza
tion from the armed forces and from war industries in August
i; Schlotterbeck, T., 0P . Cit. p. 20
2, Beveridse, William S^Vf Pull Employment in a Free Soc iet
• W.W. Norton C0 ., 1945 ' '
'
3i Binsse, ' H.L. , Commonweal, May 5, 1945, p. 54
4; Wallace, Henry
,
op . Cit., p. 11
5; Ibid, p; 4
'
6. O'Brien, John C., The sign, October 1944, p. 132

10.
1.
1945 when Japan sued for peace will not seek re -employment
•
It is estimated that about 5,100,000 workers in
war industries belong to three classes which normally do
not enter the working class : (a) workers beyond the retire-
ment age who from patriotic motives took up work acaln; (b)
women previously in the home-making category; (c) youths
under normal working age.
The first croup includes both those who have re-
turned from retirement to the labor force and those who have
continued in employment beyond the normal age of retirement.
We do not know the precise number of persons in this group.
However, statistics show that in the spring of 1943 there
were 600,000 aged workers entitled to federal retirement
benefits who had failed to file their claims, presumably
because they we^e still working; and that there were also
60,000 who had given up old age benefits payments, apparent-
ly to take .1obs.
Since not all aged workers are covered by the
federal retirement benefit system, the total number of work-
ers in this group is doubtless in excess of 660,000. Prom
the estimate of the Bureau of the Census as to the increase
in the number of workers in the older groups, we would
estimate that there might well be as many as 1,000,000 who
are beyond the normal retiring; age. *t is almost safe to say
i; Schl6tterbeck, Karl T., Op. Cit., p. 10
2'. Ibid. p. 12
3. U.S.Department of C^merce, Bureau' of the Census, The
Labor Force Bulletin, September 30, 1943
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that all of this group will be expected to retire from
the labor force now that the war is over.
The women under consideration include only
women beyond the age of twenty-four years, This class of
women has normally been engaged in homemaking activities,
They have entered the labor force for a variety of reasons J
some because of patriotism or the pressure of public senti-
ment 5 others because of the lure of high wages; and still
others because of the economic necessity occasioned by the
enlistment of husbands or the oinch of higher costs of
living.
As a direct result of the war, the working force
of the women in this country has now reached the record
total of 18,000,000 which is roughly twice as many as dur-
ing the last war. *n 1920 women comprised 20.4 percent of
the total labor force and in 1943 they comprised 30 percent.
1.
By the end of 1944 the total had risen to 18,100,000 out of
2.
a total labor market of 66,510,000.
However, most of the excess among youner women under
thirty five reflects the effect of the draft on service wives
and is likely to disappear as service men return to civilian
.lobs. Maintainance of high marriage and birth rates which
accompany prosperous times, could actuallv reduce labor
3.
market participation of youns women below normal levels.
i: Statistical Abstract' of U.S. N0 . 56 "1944-45
2'. Monthly Labor Review, 'October 1945 p. 830
3. Ibid. November 1945 p. 841
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Women will not sweep in and out of shipyards
without leaving their mark, They left their mark after
World War I* This time there are many more of them, in a
much wider range of .1obs. In a survey conducted by the
Women f s Bureau of the united states department of ^abor, it
was discovered that 75 to 80 percent of the women wanted to
1.
continue working in plant .lobs, T^e slight decrease in the
female labor employed of 16,710,000 out of a total market of
53,310,000 by December 1945 shows their preference to remain
2,
in the labor market.
In a similar survey in which a questionnaire was
answered by five hundred women machine operators, inspect-
ors, and factory office helpers, only 30 percent were re-
turning to homemaking; 48 percent said that they would
continue in factory work, and 14 percent said that they
3.
would return to white collar jobs.
It is very evident that the war years from 1940-
1944 have radically changed the nicture of child labor and
youth employment in the U.S. In the two decades preceding
1940, the employment of boys and girls had been steadily
decreasing, ™he number of working minors, fourteen through
seventeed years of age, fell from nearly 2,500,000 in 1920
to about 1,000,000 in 1940. during the four years since 1940,
i; Business Week, December 29, 1945 p. 92
2i Monthly' Lao or Review, February 1946, p. 347'
3. Fleming, H., Survey ^rapgic October 1944 p. 415
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urgent demands for workers of all ages especially in war
production centers, high wartime wages, patriotic pressures,
and social restlessness have pushed the number of employed
boys and girls of this age group up to unprecedented levels.
Census figures for 1940 and estimates based on census sample
surveys since that date show an increase from about 1,000,000
in 1940 to 2,900,000 in April 1944 in the number of young
workers in this age group. During the summer months of 1943
1.
and 1944 the number approached 5,000,000.
^e can conclude that most of the wartime additions
from the youngest and oldest groups are likely to disappear,
because the youngsters will soon reach normal working age
and the older persons are already past normal retirement age.
This assumes a return to the prewar trend toward longer school-
ing and earlier retirement whic^ in turn would mean a reduced
inflow of new workers for several years and an increased with-
drawal of older workers. A considerable number of young persons,
however, will want part-time work while attending school. If
the government should adopt a universal training program for
youths between eighteen and twenty-one it 'would take out of
2.
the labor market each year about 500,000.
Although many of these so-called extra workers have
already left the labor market and many more will leave in 1946,
yet the war's impact is certain to have lasting effects uoon
i; Merrett, Month3iy Labor Review, 'April 1945 p. 756
2. O'Brien, John C., 0p . Cit., p. 132
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the size and composition of the labor force for many years
to come. There will probably be from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000
1.
of these extra workers in the postwar labor force by 1950.
Therefore, there actually will be more than 60,000,
000 in the labor force by 1950, for it is estimated above
that as many as 2,000,000 of those who have been drawn into
war work out of homes and schools may decide to continue to
work. But if we take into account about 2,000,000 who are
norma 1 ly not working even in prosperity which is the so-call-
ed frictional unemployment, we come back to the 60,000,000
persons in the 1950 labor force for whom we need 60,000,000
.lob opportunities.
C. DISTRIBUTION OP EMPLOYMENT
Guaranteeing 60,000,000 jobs is not the task of
manufacturing industry alone but rather it relies upon
agriculture, mining, construction, transportation, public
utilities, trade distribution, and finance, service and
miscellaneous occupations. ^hls distribution of employment
is not a matter of chance or of arbitrary action. It is
determined by the character of the desires which are reflect-
ed in market demands for the various goods and services. If
the people want more amusements and fewer household furnish-
ings, employment in the amusement industries will tend to be
11 Monthly' Labor Revlew, November 1945 p. 841
2. Wallace, Henry, Op. Cit., p. 11
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stimulated and in household furnishings depressed.
The table which follows shows the actual distrib«
ution of workers in the various types of economic activity
1.
since 1900.
TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OP WORKERS 1900-1940
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, public
' utilities
Trade, distribution and
Finance
Service
Miscellaneous
TOTALS
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
35:5^
2:4
e:o
22.3
3i:e# 26:7^
3:1 3:0
5:8 3:9
24.0 26.8
2419%
2:i
6:2
21.3
23;4#
i;7
4M
24.5
6.0 7.0 8.6 7.5 6.3
n;e
14,2
12;3
14.3
i:9
13:8
15.2
2:0
17:0
18.9
16:5
2i;3
2
>
2
*100.0% 100.0%100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
While there has been considerable change over the
four decades in the proportion employed in various types of
activities, since 1920 a certain degree of stability is
evident. Agriculture and transportation have slowly declined
in the last twenty years, while the trade and service groups
have increased in relative importance — the service group
including government. The greatest fluctuation is in the
field of construction. *t should be noted, however, that in
1. National Industrial Conference B 0ard. The Economic
Almanac 1943-44 pps. 117-18
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periods of acute depressions such as the early thirties the
percentage of manufacturing declined well below the levels
indicated in the census years, which on the whole have been
marked by fairly good business conditions.
In discussing the distribution of the postwar em-
ployment it often appears to be assumed that private industry,
meaning chiefly manufacturing, must provide all or nearly all
of the additional jobs required, This would mean, using a
rough figure of 8,000,000 as the number of new jobs required
for 1947 and full employment, that manufacturing would have
to provide employment for something like 19,000,000 persons
; i. ;
instead of a little over 11,000,000 as in 1940. However,
unless there is some reason for believing that the demand for
manufactured products can be stimulated out of all proportion
to the demands for other goods and services, one cannot well
proceed on the assumption that all or the greater part of the
additional employment required can be furnished by manufact-
uring industry.
^ore logically it would mean a small reduction in
the percentage employed in agriculture and a small increase
in the percentage employed in service activities. It would
also mean a considerable increase in the percentage employed
in manufacturing and a decrease in the percentage employed
in trade distribution, and finance and service activities.
1. Schlotterbeck, %rl T,, 0p . Cit. p. 22
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On the basis of these alternative assumptions,
the increase in the number of workers employed in the
various fields of activity would be as follows '
1.
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION INCREASE 1940 TO 1947
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Transportation
Public Utilities
Trade, Finance
Services
Miscellaneous
1940 Increase in 1947
10,789 1,000
756 ' 100
Hi 288 2; 400
i;907 1,600
1,948 400
'956 200
7;631 ' 500
9,859 1,500
978 200
TOTALS 46.112 7.900
Henry Wallace foresees about 23,000,000 of the
60,000,000 job opportunities in agriculture, in domestic
service, in the category of self-employed business and
professional men, in salaried managers and officials, in
government (Federal, State and Local), and in the armed
services. These 23,000,000 job opportunities would be
divided roughly as follows '
Government and the armed forces would supply 7,000,000
Agriculture would supply about 8,000^000
Domestic services would supply about 2j 000^000
Self-employed would supply about 610001000
23,000,000
1. Schlotterbeck, Kari T«
,
0P . Cit. p. 23

18.
In 1940 slightly more than 4,000,000 workers were
employed by Federal, state, and local governments. During
the war, civilian employment in all three branches has in-
creased to almost 6,000,000. The number employed for post-
war Jobs in government can be estimated to rane;e from
4,500,000 to 5,000,000 and at the peacetime Army and NaVy
strength of around 2, 500,' 000 men 7,000,000 j'obs will be
1.
furnished by government.
The estimate of 8,000,000 postwar 5obs in agri-
culture is about 2,000,000 below the prewar figure and
approximately the same as the present number working on
farms. 2,000,000 servants in the homes after the war is a
little higher than the number employed in domestic service
during the war, but not as high as the number who crowded
into this field during the depression when better paying
jobs elsewhere were not available.
To provide and maintain employment for the other
37,000,000 persons we must find markets for the products of
18,000,000 people at work in manufacturing, mining, and con-
struction. *f there is a market for the products they make,
markets either home or abroad, then employment in these fields
2.
would average as follows '
Manufacturing and mining 15j000|000
Construction 3^500j000
Utilities and Transportation 3^500^000
Trade ' 9i000;000
Finance, services and 6^ 000 i 000
miscellaneous (Sub T0tal) 37,000,000
• • ....
i; WanaCe, Henry 0p . (Tit., p. 12
2. Ibid. p. 12

19.
Sub Total 37,000,000
Jobs from agriculture, service,
government 23^000^ 000
TOTAL 60,000,000
In both 1929 and 1940 there were more than
10,000,000 employed in manufacturing, construction, and
mining, and since, in 1943, the war's peak, the figure was
almost 17,000,000 it seems reasonable to expect at least
14,000,000 jobs in manufacturing. Mining will provide the
other 1,000,000 which is about the same as the 1929 figure
and a little higher than the 1940 figure.
Construction will have the greatest expansion in
postwar employment and it is estimated therefore that this
will provide jobs for 3,500,000 workers. Transportation and
public utilities can be expected to provide from 3,500,000
to 4,000,000 postwar jobs wMch is slightly higher than the
number in 1940 and very little different from the 1929 figure.
The number of jobs in trade depends directly on the prosper-
ity of the rest of the workers. Howe ver, since in 1929 there
were about 6,000,000 people working in trade, it is reason-
ably safe to supoose that this will account for 9,000,000
job opportunities.
The regaining 6,000,000 jobs will be scattered in
the fields of finance, services, and miscellaneous activities.
In 1929 about 4,000,000 people were employed in the categori-
es of these activities and in the heighth of the war produc-
tion, when it was impossible for people to hire employees in
these fields, we had more than 4,000,000 persons employed.

20.
With full employment, however, and shorter working hours
after the war a demand for 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 people
1.
in this field is anticipated.
In a graph showing the increase in the distribution
of workers from 1940-1950, Mr. wallace sets up the follow-
2.
TABLE 5. INCREASE IN DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS 1940,1950
1940 1950
Unemployed
2'.5%Armed forces ;6
Government 3:9 4:5
Agriculture 9;i 8.0
Domestic service 2:0 2.0
Self employed 6:4 6:0
Manufacturing and mining 10.9 15:0
Utilities and transportation 1:6 3:5
Construction 2:7 3:5
Trade 6M 9:0
Finance 3:6 6.0
TOTALS 55,3^ 60.0%
*n contrast to Henry Wallace f s assurance that a
proper distributional increase of 5ob opportunities will
result in 60,000,000 jobs, it is estimated that by 1947
we will have unemployment in all fields of activity. The
following table shows what will be the need for 60,000,000
iobs in each field and what will probably be the proper *
3.
distribution in 1947, with 5,000,000 persons unemployed.
i; Wallace, Henry, 0P . Cit., p. 40
2. ' Ibid. 'pps. -40-41
3. Barnes, ^eo, Nation May 26, 1945 p. 593

TABLE 4. PROBABLE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS 1947 (millions)
FIELD MARCH UUj WWW j www J. t7T: (
-
1 Q40X C7"±W Pr» rtVi aVilo
Mnrnifactur 1 ner* CX i iLX X. CXO UUl _L XXfcij 10
1
6% 14 17$ 1214$
Ml nine 19 19 18
Cnn + tmip "h 1 on 2.0 3.7 3.2
Tt»an snortat i on 2;2 218 2.5
CnmmiiTi 1 ft at. 1 o*ff S .4 15 .4
Public U+iii+ies .5 15
Wholesale, retail 8.3 718
Flrmnoe. insurance 115X • t_ 1.7X • I 1.6X • \J
Bn o 1 no c Q
-L • W x . w
Pp v>p,rtrio1 services 410 4 '.3 411~ • X
Rftfrfiatl on !4 15 .4
Pv> <-kfp eel Awn] O » ( W » C5
Mi «s n ft T 1 ane ous nrivatfiJ. O V -X- J- CAX l\s \J LXO X JL V Cx CV . . » 17 1 7
A /*-«• v> 4 rtii 1 'I'll dngri cuiiiurc y • d i o * nJLU • u Q " R
(TATrO V*Y1Wlo 4"uOV"I IxIHt; nXi i • o O -1<i • _L <c • w
Total 4612 DO • O
regular
f
market
Emergency gov t works 2.7 210 215
Total market 48.9 57.5 53.0
Armed forces 13 215 215
Total Employment 4912 6010 5515
Total Unemt>iovment6i2 -510
Total l>abor ^ovce 55.4% 61.5% 60.5%
Wo matter what the final distribution is in the
fields of employment it is clear that it depends upon them
all to provide the job opportunities for the 60,000,000
jobs needed for full employment. In the last presidential
campaign when Governor Thomas Dewey of New ^ov'k asked again
and again if we must have a war to make jobs, he knew that
in the past the answer had always been, yes. The one sure
cure we seem to have found for the curse of unemployment has
been the terrible cure of war, a cure which is worse than the
disease itself. When we produce to destroy we make full use

22.
of our tremendous capacity to produce. Can it be that we
shall learn from this ordeal how to keep the wheels of
industry, agriculture, mining, transportation, construc-
tion and trade turning now that we have peace?

23.
CHAPTER II
DEMOBILIZATION AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
In August 1945 at the time of Japan f s surrender we
1.
had in the armed services 12,160,000 men and women. The de-
mobilization of these millions is bound to leave its mark
upon the labor market as it is trying to re -employ these an?
countless millions who have lost their wartime Jobs.
Although in the latter oart of 1945 public opinion
tried to get the demobilization speeded up, it was quite
evident that this could not be done too hastily. In the first
place, military considerations must be taken into account.
We must keep a margin of safety in preserving the armed
forces at such strength as is required by military necessity.
Men are needed in the armies of occupation, for the protec-
tion of our possessions, and possibly as part of some post-
2.
war international police system.
A. PLAN OP DEMOBILIZATION
Demobilization, however, was faster than anyone
dared to anticipate. After the end of the war in A^ust
1945, Henry Stimson as Secretary of war pledged the dis-
• 3. '
charge of 5,000,000 soldiers within twelve months. TQ ac-
complish this a point system was set up by the Army and
Navy which, although different in total points, was based
I'm Monthly Labor Review, October 1945 p. 830
2. Public Affa irs Committee, Inc., Win I Find a Job?",
' '%w York, 1943 p. 5
3. New York Time s, Au^g^ 16> 1945, p. 13
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upon points given for length of service, number of depend-
ents, and battle participation. Since not everyone could be
dismissed at the same time, the points were relatively high
in the beginning and then lowered as time went along to let
the men out in a gradual fashion. The separations were stepp-
ed up to 250,000 a month in September to 350,000 in October,
to 450,000 in November, to 600,000 in December 1945, and
-1.
finally to a peak of 672,000 in January 1946. By January
1946, 5,000,000 men had been released and plans were 'made
2.
then to discharge another 2,750,000 by July 1, 1946.
Military necessity and limitations caused the rate of de-
mobilization to be handled in this manner. Consequently, we
did not have millions of servicemen looking for jobs .lust at
the time when industry was least able to provide *obs.
The necessity of maintaining a larger army than we
ever had is apparent since we must take our share in occupy-
ing both Germany and Japan. The Arny nas set j^g needs for
its permanent peacetime strength at 1,500,000 while the Navy
expects to reach its reduced goal of 500,000 enlisted men
and 50,000 officers, which with 100,000 marines will com-
3.
prise their permanent peacetime strength. However, the post-
war strength of the armed forces is dependant, of course,
not solely upon the decision of the War and Navy Departments,
but upon the desires of the people of the U.S. as expressed
i; New York T inies, August 29, ' 1945 p'. 1
2; Ibid: January 16i 1945 p. 15
3. Ibid. January 20, 1945 p. 27
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through C0ngress, t is to be presumed that the exact peace-
time manpower needs of the Army and Navy will be related to
postwar security requirements and the type of military
system which the nation chooses to establish for the future.
It now appears that the security requirements of
the world situation with the conclusion of hostilities will
involve development of a peace machinery primarily supported
by the victorious democratic powers which will call for
American participation in the maintenance of peace. It will
be obvious that without careful study of responsibilities
under each plan for the maintenance of security, it would
be impossible to indicate specifically the needs of our arm-
1.
ed forces in the postwar period. It is generally accepted
though and known as a necessity that we must keep our army
for occupational duty to protect the interests that were
purchased at so high a cost. To do this alone would take off
the labor market between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men who
otherwise would be demobilized and looking for jobs.
Although a very controversial issue, it is still
apparent that the universal training for bo^s may be part of
our laws in the near future. A universal military training
act wo.i Id provide that all the able-bodied males of the U.S #
should devote, as part of their democratic contribution to
the welfare of the nation, a period of one year to military
1. Annuals' of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, March 1945 Philadelphia 1945 p. 59
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instruction given bv the Armv or the Navy . 1^ computed
that tMs program would permit t^e training of 3pprox5.mate-
ly POO, 000 vouncf men a vear, 600,000 for the Army and
1.
200,000 for the %vy. Therefore, if this act is passed by
Congress, it would take from our ever expanding labor market
about 800,000 boys that would be eligible for jobs.
Continuance of the Selective Service Ac t also
seems to be in order. Although the Armv has enlisted 600,000
men, more than 53 percent of t^ese for three vears, the
enlistments fell from about 185,000 in November to 93,874 in
February 1946. The Navy enlistments amounted to 162,000 men
from July 1, 1945 to March 9, 1946, some 117,000 of these
were two years' enlistment. However, should the wartime draft
be discontinued, it would place a gre^t burden on the military
services already overburdened wit^ the unparrallelled problem
of transition from peace to war. ^t would mean not only
elimination of one source of Army manpower —an average of
perhaps 33,000 to 60,000 draftees every month — but probab-
2.
ly diminution of volunteer enlistments for ^11 services.
Therefore, it seems necessary to continue the drafting of
men for the armed forces which would take off the labor
market between 30,000 and 60,000 persons each month.
The magnitude of the impending veteran re-emplov-
ment problem, joined with an awareness of the exceptional
1. Annuals of the American Aca<jemv of Political and ocial
Science, March 1945, Philadelphia, p. 60
2. New York Times , March 22, 1946 p. 10
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arduousness of the service which many veterans will have
performed, can well give rise to feelings of wonderment
concerning the possibilities and the consequences of their
reabsorbtion into civilian life. After World war I a brief
period of intense concern was quickly dissipated by the ease
with which all but a few of the discharged men found their
own way back into a peacetime existence. The end of ^orld
^ar II, however, did leave a veteran population of several
times a greater size than that of 1919, The shocks of this
1.
war unon the veteran have been far more intense and prolonged,
B. PLAN OP BENEFITS
Realizing that many persons will experience diffi-
culty in readjustment from war to peace activities, Federal
agencies are trying to make certain that such persons re-
ceive information regarding services and benefits that have
2.
been provided to help individuals make the readjustment.
At the end of the last war, the men were given a
$60,00 bonus and a ticket home, This supposedly ended the
government s obligation to the men who had served it, but it
was so clearly inadequate that years later the government
was forced to grant a large cash bonus to the war veterans.
Today it is agreed that the government has a greater obliga-
tion than this,
1. Annuals' of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Op. Cit., forward p, V"
2; Monthly ^abor Review, July 1944, p. 130'
3. Public Affair g Committee, ' Inc.
,
Op. Cit. p. 9
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In the passage of the G. I« Bi.H of Rights,
Congress gave the veterans seme benefits to ease the de-
mobilization and readjustment period. Mustering-out pay of
$300. was given by the Federal Government to veterans with
overseas duty. $200.00 was given to those who had served
more than sixty days, but had no foreign service, and $100.
bonus was granted to veterans with less than sixty days'
1.
active service.
Massachusetts followed suit by giving $100.00
mustering-out nay, while other states granted bonuses of
various amounts. For officers, terminal leaves were grant-
ed • a period of time for which the officers were paid their
salaries on the basis of days of leave they had owing to
them. An this added up to giving the veterans money to live
on while they are looking for jobs and hence helping to keep
-
. •
the labor market in somewhat of a stable condition.
The general eligibility requirements for the three
new benefits under the G. I. Bin of Rights (which are educa-
tion, loans, and readjustment allowances) are service in the
active military service on or after September 16, 1940 and
prior to the end of the war; discharge or release therefrom
under conditions other than dishonorable after ninety days
service, or if sooner, discharge for disability incurred in
2.
line of duty.
1. "'Veterans Benefits" U.S. • Gov't Printing Office
Pamphlet #44 "December 15, 1944' p. 889
2. Hines, Frank, November 1, 1944, Vital Speeches of the Day,
p. 58
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The Servicemen 1 s Readjustment Act of 1944 provides
for an educational program for all returning veterans who
qualify under the G. I. Bin of R ights. Many of the veterans
will have received intensive education or accelerated college
courses during indoctrination for service and in off-duty
class, lecture or correspondence courses which have been made
available for those who have had time to take advantage of
them. They have developed new skills in their daily duties
and have been matured by discipline and dangerous experience.
Many of these persons will not wish to return to their old
jobs but will prefer to make use of their newly acquired
skill; others will desire specialized training for many types
of ,1qbs which will be foreseen in a changing world. Under
this lawj a refresher or retraining course is available for
a period of one year without regard to the ahe of the veteran
when he entered the service. He may take this course in any
approved school or establishment where he wisbes institutional
1.
or on-the-.lob training. The veteran must start his course not
later than two years after either the date of Ms discharge
2.
or the termination of the war, whichever is later.
Those veterans who are eligible for education from
one to four years are dependent upon age or interruption of
school with the total period dependent upon length of service.
If the veteran is over twenty five years of age when he enter-
ic Annuals
f
of the American Academy °p. c it. p. 2
2. Veteran s Rights, Privileges, Benefits, U.S.Government
Printing Office
,
Washington, D. C. October 1945 p. 25
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ed service he must prove that his education was impeded,
delayed, interrupted, or interfered with by his entrance
1.
into service. While the veteran is enrolled in and pursuing
a course of training under this law, upon his application
the Veteran f s Administration will pay him a subsistence
allowance of $65,00 per month if without dependents or $90.00
2.
per month if he has dependents.
In a recent Army survey it was found that 37.1
percent planned to return to old .jobs under guarantee of
the Selective Service Act, 30.3 percent either had no job
waiting for ttiem or wanted to change employment, 9.4 per-
cent wanted to return to school or engage in full time
training or education, 8.6 percent were planning to engage
in farming, 8.4 percent were interested in part time train-
ing or education, 6.2 percent planned to go into business
for themselves, and 15.1 percent were undecided as to their
3.
future.
The veterans have responded to a great extent to
the education benefits afforded them. The February total of
college veterans was 300,000 with an estimate made of this
4.
total rising to 750,000 by September. It is evident, therefore,
that these veterans will be off our labor markets for a
period of two to four years while they are in the schools,
1. Veteran's Rights, Privileges, Benefits, UJ3. Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C., October 1945, p. 25
2. Public Law 268, 79th Congress, Chapter 588, p. 4
3. Business Week, January 19, 1946, p. 99
4. New York Times, January 6, 1946, p. 1
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thus relieving our market of sane pressure at a highly
important time.
To help the ex-servicemen start off into business
or home making the G.I. Bin of R ights provides that private
or government lending agencies or individuals may make loans
to qualified veterans and that the U.S. will guarantee 50
-
; i.
percent of the loan, but no more than *2,000. Interest on
the principal must be no more than 4 percent; on second
loans, not more than 1 percent additional. The Federal
government must pay the first year's interest on the amount
guaranteed.
The unemployment feature of the bill is known as
the readjustment allowance. The allowance provided is $20.00
for any week of unemployment or such amount less any wages
received in excess of #3.00 for any week of partial employ-
ment, which week occurs not later than two years after
discharge or release from active service or the termination
of the war, whichever is the later date. The total number of
weeks of eligibility of a veteran for readjustment allowances
is dependent upon his length of service. F0r the first three
months of service, a veteran may be entitled to eight weeks
of allowances for each of these first three months; there-
after, four weeks for each month of service or ma.lor fraction
thereof. The maximum of weeks to which an eligible veteran
1. Hines, Frank, 0p# Cit. P . 58
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'1.
may be entitled under this law is fifty-two.
In March 1946 one out of every four veterans
claimed unemployment compensation and Ray R. Adams, Director
of the Veteran
f
s Administration Readjustment Allowance
Service, said the peak would be reached "in April when
1,500,000 veterans would be unemployed. The Veteran s
Administration estimated that for the year 1946 1,136,977
veterans would receive unemployment compensation 628,000
3.
educational allowances, and 500,000 guaranteed loans.
An servicemen with service-connected disabili-
ties are provided with medical care and hospitalization for
their disabilities for the remainder of their lives. Compen-
sation depending upon the percentage of disibility is paid
to the veteran each month. Thus it can be seen that the Fed-
eral government has done a great deal to prepare these boys
for the readjustment that they will face in the labor market
tomorrow. An these benefits will help to cushion what might
be a very drastic blow to the total labor force.
Demobilized servicemen and women will also have
opportunities to learn trades under a program that accomp-
anies reconversion. The trades that such persons may enter
through apprenticeship will be chiefly metal working and
construction industries. The government does not pay any-
• • • • _ »
i; Hines, Frank, 0P . C±t. p'. 58 -
2; New York Times , March Hi 1946 pi 27
3. Ibid. January 23, 1946 p. 44
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thing to companies which offer work training but veterans
may collect both the wages paid to trainees and the same
1.
subsistence as if they were in schools.
Since many companies have taken advantage of this
on-the-job training, the Veteran^ Administration has start-
ed a drive to crack down on false veteran training courses
that lead the veteran nowhere. Officials said that they had
begun for the first time, direct federal supervision of
veteran trainees. They will examine the rate of pay given
the trainee to determine if it corresponds to his training
and efficiency. These new orders were aimed at "fly-by-night M
schools and job training establishments. These new controls
were set up in a field formerly left to state educational
2.
agencies
.
C. PLAN FOR RE-EMPLOYING THE VETERAN
To assist the veteran to return to gainful and
satisfactory employment was the objective of a joint state-
ment on February 11, 1944 be the war Manpower Commiddion
and the Selective Service System.
Under the Selective Service and Training Act of
1940 the Director of Selective Service has the responsibil-
ity of establishing two personnel divisions, one to aid
veterans seeking reinstallment in their old positions and
the other to aid them in finding new positions. In accord
-
i; New York Time s, March 17. 1946 p^36 ' *
2. World Kews of the week, Marcn 25, 1946 V01. 8 #30
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ance with the policy of the Selective Service System the
responsibility for insuring the veteran's right of re-
employment has been delegated to the S^ate directors with
authority to create, within the respective Spates, the
i.
machinery which will be most effective for this purpose.
The following policies for re-employing and plac-
ing the veteran were drawn up by representatives of manage-
ment and labor :
a. In filling orders "for workers all qualified
veterans ' shall be given priority over all non-
veterans. On all orders specifying veterans,
no nonveterans shall be referred.
b. 'When veterans are available for work where no
order has been placed the veteran s representa-
tives shall make every effort to develop an
opening in the industry or profession in wMch
the veteran is interested.
c. Veterans needing employment counseling should
be served by a specially trained counselor who
shall be a veteran.
d. Special preferential service shall be accorded
all disabled veterans by all personnel and for
all jobs for which they are qualified.
e. The veteran's employment representative shall
serve any veteran having unusual problems and
every veteran shall have the right to see the
veteran representative. Service under these
circumstances may include advice about hospi-
tals, loans, and other benefits promised by
Congress which are outside the scope of the
employment office.
f . where the office has been more than one station
for the reception of applicants one or more of
these shall be specially designated for veterans
and clearly marked. The station shall be prefer-
1. Monthly Labor Review, Apr il 1944 pps. 750-1
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1.
ably attended by a veteran.
What are the re-employment rights for the veterans?
As an honorably discharged veteran he has a legal claim on
his old job if it was other than temporary, and if he was
the first to leave it to join the armed forces. If the
veteran is physically handicapped and cannot handle the old
job then he has no claim on his old employer for any job.
However, he is entitled to a chance to prove that he can
handle it. He cannot, however, be kept out of his job by any
new conditions of employment such as health standards required
for company insurances. This seniority is increased by the
number of years in the armed forces and the veteran cannot
be fired for one year without cause.
However, to get his old job back he must apply for
it within ninety days after discharge or after release from
hospitalization if this occurs within a year. In case of
layoffs, for example, the veteran would have more seniority
2.
and therefore would hold on to his job longer.
In addition to seniority protection, business and
labor are making other plans to aid the returning veteran.
The CIO and APL have urrred member unions to admit all veterans
to membership, to waive initiation fees, and to cooperate in
providing on-the-job training. The^r have also moved to pro-
11 Monthly Labor Review, November 1945 p. 909
2. Catholic digest, July 1945 p. 41
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tect the disabled veteran who wants to go back to his old
company but is physically unable to do his old .job, ^hey
have recommended that their national and local unions make
every effort to incorporate in their contracts provisions
guaranteeing the right of such veterans to re-employment at
their old plants in new .lobs they can do -- and at the
regular wacre rate. Ty,is is to protect disabled veterans
1.
from being paid less than other workers on the same job.
The experience of the companies employing handi-
capped veterans has been that physically deficient men
excell in their jobs if their rehabilitation has been care-
fully supervised and they are employed on the basis of their
remaining capabilities. Foremen report that handicapped
veterans are a steadying influence in their departments and
they compare favorably with normal wanrkers in these respects
-- absenteeism, labor turnover, accident rate, and pro-
2.
ductivity.
Hence it can redily be seen that with this co-
operation between government, labor, and business the
returning veterans will find their adjustment to civilian
life a great deal different and easier than their fathers
did. An these plans will help to ease the strain that
ordinarily would break the labor market and lead to chaos.
It is true that the impact of demobilization is being felt
i; Catholic digest, 0p . Cit., p. 41
2. American city, December 1944 p. 97
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but it is not as drastic as it would have been if no one
had planned for the returning veterans.

38.
CHAPTER III
THE BACKLOG OF ABUNDANCE AND PULL EMPLOYMENT
In 1946 there exists an enormous pent-up demand
for the consumer goods that people were unable to buy in
the war years. Almost everything the consumers own
automobiles, tires, radios, shoes, furniture, refrigera-
tors is badly depreciated. Shelves and wharehouses
everywhere must be stocked anew with everything from clothes
to cars. Tfcis demand now becomes the backlog of unfilled
orders for business and this will give business its initial
1.
driving power.
A. ACCUMULATED SAVINGS
Many economists and business men put all their
hopes in the stability of tomorrow f s world on the power
that the American public possesses in their war savings. It
is true that whether we are to have a rising cost of living
accompanied by extreme business activity or continued un-
employment depends partly unon whether people spend their
2.
war savings and what they spend them for.
The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that in
1939, the year the war began in "Europe, the American public
saved from their individual incomes after taxes were deducted,
i; Wallace, Henry, * Op. Cit. p. 37
2. Boston Traveler, February 20, 1946
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$67,700,000,000; in 1941 they had saved $88,700,000,000; in
1944, $137,400,000,000; and by the end of 1945 they had a
1 •
backlog of $138,900,000,000. In_ February 1946 individuals
had liquid assets of about $180,000,000,000 of which
$115, 000, 000, 000 'of this total was accumulated in the war
1.
years 1942-1945.
War threw the nation back to an economy of scarci-
ty, and consequently to a savings economy. Savings were urged
as a patriotic duty for at the same time that there was a
shortage of consumer goods there was a plethora of money
oaid out for war goods. Left in the market this money would
cause a mounting inflationary pressure; put away in war
bonds and savings accounts it would be an ideal pump primer
2.
for the postwar era.
The U.S. public responded far more readily to the
urging to save than it had to the earlier urging to spend
when times were depressed. In 1944 and 1945 individuals in
the U. S. saved at the rate of almost 25 percent of their
income. In these savings lie the hope for a quick start on
5.
postwar prosperity.
These war savings may be spent for war-denied autos,
homes, and other wants or they may be held as nest eggs to
permit freer spending of current incomes. They may even be
V, Business Week, February' 16, 1946 p. 120
21 Fortune; N0vember 1945 p. 240
3. Ibid, p. 280 .
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held as capital, to produce income. The important question
is: How much of a relative increase in spending will they
1.
set free to stimulate business?
Security Exchange Commission figures show that in
1942 and 1943 some $26,000,000,000 went into increased
holdings of currency and bank deposits, $24,000,000,000 into
U.S. Bonds and perhaps #15,000,000,000 into miscellaneous
savings. Almost $7,000,000,000 of these went into private
insurance, almost •Ik ,000,000,000 into repayment of debt,
over $3,000,000,000 into new homes and the remainder into
savings and loans and other securities.
In 1942 and 1943 some $15,000,000,000 represented
E. Bonds. The other $9,000,000,000 F.&G,# Bonds, which must
be owned by persons with fairly large incomes. We know that
almost one half of the E. Bonds purchased in 1942 and 1943
were bought on payroll deduction plans and the proportion
ran higher in 1944.
Security Exchange Commission figures also show
that of an estimated $8,000,000,000 increase in demand
deposits from June 30, 1942 to June 30, 1943 only about
$5,000,000,000 were in accounts owned by what is termed an
average employee. Over two thirds of the increase went into
individuals who are not only consumers but also owners of
unincorporated business farmers, retailers, manufacturers.
1. Business ^eek, July 8, 1944, p. 120
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The rest went to * executives, salesmen, professional men and
1.
retired persons. Ty,is trend continued until at the end of
1945 only 50 nercent of total savings belonged to individuals
earning less than ^5,000 a year.
We can then see that at least one half of the bonds,
much more than one half the demand deposits and certainly a
large part of the currency accumulated in the war must have
gone to wealthy persons or owners of businesses. °ne can say
that well over one half of the wartime savings must have gone
to wealthy or business people, who may be expected to spend
something for homes or autos, or for new or expanded business-
es after the war, but are likely to hold a lot of their
accumulation as loan capital for income return.
Of course, we cannot be sure that large savings will
be held as capital for 3 percent interest on even $20,000
would return but $600 annually which is hardly enough to
make leisure pay. On the other hand smaller savings might be
figured as a start on earlier retirement, or as a beginning
on life insurance in which case they might have the effect
3.
of stimulating postwar savings, rather than postwar spending.
It must also be realized that the massive estimated
of savings, which are being counted on are savings only in
the economist^ special sense. They include such items as
1. Business Week, July 8, 1944, p. 120
2; Business week, February 15,
' 1946 p. 120
3. Business Wee k, July 8, 1944, p. 120
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decreases in prewar debt, larger holdings of insurance,
and increases in the liquid assets of the upper income
group. If we want a realistic estimate of the immediate
postwar demand for consumer's goods such items have to be
stricken out. People rarely cash in their insurance policies
to buy a new radio.
Any useful estimate would count only the reason-
ably spendable savings tucked away during the war by the
lower and middle income groups. *t must not include the
basic reserves which these families have built up before
the war, since what we are concerned with is the increase
in spendable — the "something new" which might bring
prosperity. Such an estimate compiled by the Federal
Reserve Board showed that the increase in the readily spend-
able 'savings of these families amounted to about -40,000,000,
1.
000.
*t is true that some 20,000,000 families, thanks
to war savings, may be inclined to use their current earnings
more freely and their spending may check the tendency toward
oversaving which many students hold responsible for defla-
tionary phenomena in the 1930* s.
The primary factor which will determine postwar
spending, then, will be not the size of past savings but the
size of anticipated future income. Job security, not wartime
1. Lebercrott, E. f Harper's Magazine, February 1945, p. 202
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savings, is the key to what lies ahead, ^ive the average
consumer a reasonable assurance of steady work and he will
spend a good part of his wartime reserves. ®ut leave him
uncertain of the future and he will hoard. The new promise
of security, in other words, would go a loner way toward
creating lobs; while fear of unemployment inevitablv will
1.
help to bring on the very thing we fear.
In a survey conducted by Fortune in the state of
New York only 7.9 percent said that they had no savings at
all. The ones who answered "yes" had savings distributed
as follows J
War Bonds 84:3^
^ife Insurance Policies 74^2
Savings Bank 60i3
Checking ACCOunts 39.8
Securities 22^3
Pensions 16^8
Thrift account 14:3
Savings and loan associations 11*3
Credit Union for employees 4i8
Other 5.0
These savings belonged in the following percentages to the
four classes
checking securities
accounts
Prosperous 84.9$ 77.0$
Upper middle 72.8 42.2
Lower middle 32.9 14.1
Poor 9.4 3.4
Asked what they had in mind concerning their
savings they answered! personal security and investment,
1. Lebergott, E., 0D . Cit., p. 202
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things to buy, and family living. The following shows the
percentage belonging to each of these classes.
PERSONAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT
Old age 21.8%
General savings, future security 12^7
Emergencies, sickness 10^2
Start a business 7i0
Other investment 1.8
THINGS TO BUY
Home, real estate 25
•
f%
Household equipments furni shiners 13^3
New auto 10^0
Repair or remodel home 4^7
Clothing 3.3
Other specific thiners 1.5
FAMILY LIVING
Education 16'.^
For children and family 5i9
Travel, amusement 3i7
Get married and have a family 3.3
Other general expenses 3.4
Only 13.fi percent saved without any objective at
all. A large group, 25 percent, planned to draw down their
savings in bank accounts very soon, principally to buy
homes and home improvements. Only 11 percent planned to
soend most or some of the money they had put away in war
bonds
•
Although this survey only covered one state in
the country, yet some very helpful conclusions can be
drawn from the attitudes of the people of the state of New
York that the backlog of savings cannot be counted on,
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except in a relatively small way to spark any prolonged
1.
buying boom. The saving habit, it seems, is here to stay.
In support of this, as of March 1, 1946, the
American people were holding on to their savings. It is
increasingly clear that heavy withdrawals are not in the
immediate prospect. Of the $95,000,000,000 that the public
had laid aside in U.S. Savings Bonds, and time deposits, 39
percent said that they planned to hold the bonds until
maturity, 15 percent said that they would keep them as insur-
ance against emergencies, 10 percent will use them to edu-
cate children, 3 percent plan to use them as support in
retirement. Only 8 percent said that they would cash bonds
to build homes, while 5 percent would cash them to buy
2.
consumer goods
.
In January 1946 only 18.81 percent of the war
bonds which individuals bought between May 1941 and Decem-
3.
ber 31, 1945 had been redeemed. January and February
found a total of #1,194,000,000 worth of war bonds cashed
while estimates of $700,000,000 were made for the month of
March 1946. This volume is attributed to redemption by
income taxpayers, by strikers who have had to dip into
savings, by displaced war workers, and returning service-
men. The Treasury Department expects the cashing to level
4.
off at $500,000,000 a month.
1. Fortune, Op. Git., p. 280
2. U.S. News, March 29, 1946, p. 46
3. New York Times, January 14, 1946
4. U.S. News, Op. cit., p. 46
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However, wartime savings are so vast in themselves
that they'will in fact result in some spending beneficial to
1.
business. This backlog of savings is bound to have a tre-
mendous effect upon postwar markets and consequently upon our
problem of full employment. unless the people in America
spend their money we will return to the same conditions we
had just before the war started of excessive savings and
depressed spending resulting in low business conditions.
However, now that the war is over the current
income of the general class of people has been loxvered,
because overtime has been cut out, peacetime 'rates lowered,
2.
and in some cases many have lost their "obs. Savings have in
these cases helped to carrv these Deople over the first few
months of postwar living. However> we m\iat search for means
of providing these people with income so that they will have
current money to create the demand for the products that will
keep up our expanding economy. It is only in security that we
will find full employment and only with the high level of
savings can we have sufficient spending to warrant this free
enterprise economy.
Business concerns must be successful in convert-
ing these savings into spending at precisely the times when
they will be most beneficial. These savings might be convert-
ed when demand for goods is overtaxing the productive capa-
1. Business «eek, July 8, 1944 p. 120
2. Harper, 0p# Cit. p. 202
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city of industry. Hence, American business men have the in-
escapable social responsibility of working out arrangements
by which they can time their influence upon demand so as to
promote stability of employment rather than to accentuate
the fluctuations of business. The high accumulations of liquid
assets greatly increase the potential instability of business
so that it would be hazardous in the extreme for business
men to fail to create effective arrangements for stabilizing
their own influence upon the demand for goods.
Although the conversion of wartime savings into
goods will make a high level of employment abnormally easy
to maintain for a few years, a difficult transition will lie
ahead— the shift from a "catching-up" economy to a self-
1.
sustaining economy.
B. FRONTIER OP HOUSING
Housing is probably the largest of our new fron-
tiers of job opportunities, W« now know that nearly half
of our homes are below standards and we know too that slum
conditions exist to greater or less extent in every city and
2.
town in the land. The greatness of the need is very apparent,
therefore. In the 1940 census nearly one fourth of the
37,000,000 dwelling units in the country needed major repairs,
while another quarter were in need of plumbing, heating, or
3.
other primary essentials to decent living.
1. Slichter, Sumner, "Present Savings and Postwar Markets",
McGraw-Hill, New York 1943, pg.73
2. Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 38
3. Ibid, p. 38
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% addition to these numbers a sizable percentage
of 30,000,000 industrial workers and 12,000,000 members of
1.
the armed services will be setting up new homes.
In the last quarter of 1945 we were producing
20,000 units a month and estimates stated that by the end
of 1946 we should be producing 80,000 units a month. The
greatest need is not for $10,000 houses but rather for
houses ranging from $2,500 to $3,000. The people whose in-
come is only $1,000 to $2,000 a year have the greatest need
for houses and consequently it is senseless to build houses
that are way out of their income reaches.
The estimates of how many units will be needed to
rehouse America range from 820,000 anually to 2,000,000.
2,000,000 units a year would completely rehouse America in
approximately twenty years. This presupposes a rate of de-
molitions that is likely to affect most, if not all, resi-
dential real estate values, local tax structures, mortga-
ges, and thrift institutions. The cost to the economic
system of scrapping facilities as a rate permitting this
volume of new facility production would far outweigh the
advantages of any conceivable savings that might be achiev-
ed through quantity production of homes. Hence it looks as
if we are headed for a boom, but if this demand under the
• • • *
.
1. Perkins, John, sales Mahagement, November 1, 1945
2. 0 Grady, iT0hn, Rt. Rev., Catholic inference cm
Industrial Problems
3. Holden, T.S., Arcn itectural Record, September 1943 p. 50
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impetus of spending wartime savings, is allowed to develop
without regard to unified planning in cities and communities,
we shall merely have this expansion and then find ourselves
on the downgrade again. Based on past patterns, we should in
a very short while reach the yearly total of 900,000 units
'1.
and then quickly subside to about 100,000 units a year.
To help relieve the housing shortage that prevails
in 1946, Housing Expeditor, w ilson W. Wyatt set up a program
to start 2,700,000 new homes between 1946 and 1947 which
involves not only priorities, allocations, and price controls,
2.
but also a number of other emergency measures. A tough two
year program of government control is what Mr . %att wants
3.
which would include the following »
a. price ceilings on old and newly built homes
and on city building lots, the object of which
is to keep home prices within the reach of
most home buyers and prevent inflationary rise'
that would kill off the expected building boom.
b. priorities and allocations of building
materials are to be continued until materials
are much closer to normal supply. Tn6se priorities
are intended to channel half the available
materials into homes priced at $6,000 or less.
» - — ^ •
c. low cost housing is emphasized.' The greatest
heed is for homes that sell for #6,000 or less
and rent for $50 .00 a month or under.
d. non-essential building is to be discouraged
or forbidden.
e. price increases on some scarce building
1. Wallace, Henry, 0P . clt., p. 39
2. Business 'Week, February 16, 1946 p. 25
3. U.S.News, February 15, 1946 p72
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materials are to be allowed if materials involved
do not enter substantially into the price of the
finished
jf
house . ^r. Wyatt also calls for premium
payments , a form of subsidy for increased pro-
duction of scarce materials.
f . shortage of labor is a problem to be solved by
recruiting 1,500,000 additional workers by mid
1947.
g. pre fabric at ion' of houses — 250,000 such houses
this year and 600,000 in 1947.
h. Army camp buildings can help to releive the
shortage but only as a temporary measure.
i. veterans to be given first consideration.
rapid tax amortization for newly built material
plants, absorbtion by government ' of undue risks in
the development of new materials, federal co-
operation of building sites, and federally insured
mortgages up to 90 percent of current values.
Mr. Wyatt has asked for a congressional appropria-
tion of $600,000,000 for premium payments to hasten the out-
put of scarce materials, and an additional 250,000,000 to
sponser research by private groups on new construction
materials and methods. The Wyatt program was, in April 1946,
receiving congressional consideration.
Hence it is evident that housing will be among the
first of our postwar projects that will aid in the attain-
ment of full employment. *n sustained full employment, hous-
ing can provide both directly and indirectly at least 4,000,
000 jobs. T 0 build the 16,000,000 to 18,000,000, new units
1. Senior Scholastic, March 4, 1946 p. 11
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over a ten-year period would require the full time of about
3,000,000 men a year both on-site and off-site for ten years.
Off-site workers would include those in industires that
supply the building trades as brikyards and manufacturing
plants of all kinds. Another 200,000 men or so would be
needed full time to bring substandard units up to the min-
imum — making a total of about 3,200,000 lobs merely to
1.
provide a minimum standard of housing for the nation. In
addition there will be many jobs for carpenters, brick-
layers, painters, electricians, and plumbers in the ordinary
routine of building and remodeling.
There is almost universal recognition that long
range planning of housing construction is necessary to attain
greater stability in all of the construction industry. Bous-
ing not only represents a very large part of all construc-
tion, but is chiefly responsible for the great swings in
total construction employment. The aim, in this field of
activity, therefore, should be to make unified olans for
the whole of the construction industry so as to maintain
*2.
construction as an adequate and gradually expanding level.
1.
Wallace; Henry, Op. c it. p. 39
2. Ibid, p. 40
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CHAPTER IV
RECONVERSION AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
With the war over, America found itself with the
1.
following enormous resources '
a, new manpower by the millions. Skilled workers
from war industries, military manoower, and young
people coming of working age.
b; the largest industrial plant capacity in the
world.
c. the greatest resources both natural and arti-
ficial to make peacetime 'products ; thousands of'
new inventions waiting to be converted to peace-
time use.
d. the largest scientific farm plant in the world.
e. the biggest backlog of requirements for hous-
ing, transportation, communications, and living
comforts
.
f. the greatest reserve of accumulated savings
by individuals than any nation has ever known
at one time.
With all these potentialities looking at business, that will
undoubtedly bring prosperity, it was the task of business to
reconvert from war to peace as easily as possible. What
happened to the country in the changeover from war to peace
depended on our capacity to make adjustments and to make them
fast. For with the war over, a new victory had to be won as
contracts for munitions and ships were cancelled, and pro-
1. W anac e, Henry, Vital Speeches of the Day, Aug 1, 1943,
p. 612
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duction cuts and plant layoffs riDned the fabric of war-
time employment.
It was generally accepted in discussion of post-
war economic prospects to speak of "transitional unemploy-
ment
11 during the reconversion period. The assumption was
that while many workers would be displaced from war indus-
tries as production programs were complete and contracts
were cancelled, most of them would before long find .lobs
making the goods for which civilians, in 1946, are vainly
clamoring. Due t 0 the fact mentioned on page 39 concern-
ing the pent-up demand backed by the war savings, the tran-
sition was expected to be not very serious in either volume
or duration. The transition was expected to find its end in
another era of high employment when workers would be busy
'2.
making civilian goods. *n the first weekly survey of the
labor market conditions after the surrender of Japan in
August 1945, it showed that 2,000,000 workers had been re-
3.
leased from their jobs. *n the months following, many found
new lobs while others were added to the list of unemployed.
The Census Bureau reports that in February 1946 only 2,700,
000 persons were looking for 1obs while 3,500,000 persons
4.
were drawing or applying for unemployment compensation.
The number of releases in different industries de-
li Haber, W., Survey Graphic, October 1945 pps 388-93
2'. New Republic, Juiy 23, 1945, p. 94
3. New Yorv Times, August 30, 1945 p. 13
4. U.S.News, 1Vtarch 15, 1946, p. 19
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pended upon the swiftness of reconversion. Many industries
produced for the Army and Navy the same products they turned
out for the peacetime market. For them reconversion was mere-
ly a matter of returning their output to the civilian trade.
The textile industry, for example, ceased making military
uniforms and increased its production of civilian garments.
But other industries, like the aviation industry,
had nothing ahead but a drastic reduction in output. *n
August 1945 the Army slashed its purchases of aircraft 94
'1.
percent. Estimates show that the total number of military
2.
and civilian aircraft needed by 1950 is only 500,000
which would only employ a mere fraction of the facilities
and working force of our aviation companies.
Still others, like the automobile industry, were
engaged solely in the production of equipment for the armed
forces but with the war over thev were able to return to
peacetime production. However, for them reconversion was
not simple. *n many instances, the automobile industry had
completely retooled for war production. A large percentage
of these tools were unsuitable for the manufacture of peace-
time -production. Moreover, their own tools were so commingled
with tools purchased and owned by the government that it took
a long time to straichted out the tangle. Many Q f the largest
war producers were operating in government-owned plants some
1. New York Times, Augus t 15, 1945 p. 12
2. Air Transportation, May 1945 p. 27
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of which the operators had an option to buy while others
were owned by the government without strings.
As the auto industry did reconvert the govern-
ment estimated that it would turn out 500,000 cars in the
last quarter of 1945. Actually about 80,000 were turned
out as labor made its wage demands and industry ran into
strikes, consequently only 48,775 cars were turned out in
January 1946 and 47,665 in February 1946. On this basis
new car production for the year 1946 might be estimated
at under 600,000. However, if all industrial labor trouble
is straightened out by April 1946 production could reach
156,000 for the month of A^ril and between 250,000 and
300,000 for May 1946. The auto industry expects when
operating at its normal nostwar rate to produce 500,000
1.
passenger cars each month.
By January 1946 reconversion had been virtually
completed. Production and employment before the steel strike
was called had surpassed all previous peacetime figures.
However, the troubles between labor and management threat-
ened a serious set back to our aims of full production and
2.
full employment o Enough workers were out on strike in
September 1945 to cost American industry 8,000,000 man-
days on a monthly basis. *n January 1946 the strikes caus-
ed American industry to have its lowest production since
1. U.S. News, March 29, 1946 p. 29
2. New Yor k Times, January 20, 1946 p. P. 1
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1941. *n Februarv 1946 21,500 man-davs of wrok were lost
involving the strike of 1,430,000 workers. This loss during
February amounted to 3.94 percent of all available working
1.
time. In the first six months following peace production
lost 63,000,000 man-days of labor and workers lost 560,000,
2.
000 in direct wages because of the strikes. The outlook
for reconverting business depends more than anvthing else on
whether this becomes a real slugging match between manage-
ment and labor. The need is to get going in order to :
(a) give large-scale emolovment for lasting prosperity and
(b) pluck the richest consumer harvest of all time.
In the process of reconversion the workers were
laid off in these situations 1 (a) ^nany mumitions plants were
closed down as t^e Armv slashed its purchases of weapons in
3.
August 1945 from 94-100 percent; (b) this adversely affect-
ed employment in underlying industries supolying raw materials,
transportation, and other industries until civilian produc-
tion can take up the slack; (c) in some communities that had
depended on munitions production there were layoffs in stores,
restaurants, and service industries.
The amount of manufacturing employment resulting
from the munitions program may be estimated in two ways. At,
the peak of the war effort some 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 work-
ers were engaged in the final stages of producing combat
i; U.S.News, April 5, 1946 p. 37
2. U.S.News, March 1, 1946 p. 3R
3. New York Times, Ausust 15, 1945 p. 12
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material, ^hls does not count the workers producing raw
and semifinished materials, equipment, and supplies that
went into munitions but also have peacetime uses. Alter-
natively it may be noted that in 1940 just over 4,000,000
persons were employed in the metal, chemical, and rubber
manufacturing industries. At the peak of the war effort
the number was about 10,300,000; and whether or not they
were engaged in making essentially the same product as in
peacetime, it went finally into combat material. Although
90 percent of the war business has been cancelled only
2,000,000 were let out of war plant .1obs to October 1,
1.
1945 according to the Bureau of ^abor Statistics.
^n the actual reconversion period the greatest
bulk of layoffs came in August 1945. There were 1,800,000
in the week ended August 24, 300,000 in the AugUst 31st
period, 270,000 more to spetember 7th, and only 130,000
in the week ended September 14th. A striking proportion
of these workers got new }obs almost at once, while a few
2.
dropped out of the labor force.
industry progressed faster than anticipated and
it kept more workers on the payrolls during the period of
deenest cutbacks in August 1945 than most observers had
thought possible in pre -victory estimates.
It is still evident that everywhere there are
1. Business Wee k, °ctober 13, 1945 pps. 15-17
2. Ibid, September 29, 1945 p. 9
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.fobs going begging while laid off workers draw unemploy-
ment compensation, because available work pays less than
they had been making. Everywhere proportionately more
women than men have been laid off. pew plants are using any
major portion of their workers closing out war work and re-
converting. Everywhere there is a temporary inefficiency.
In a survey made of different cities in September
1945 the following facts are found to be true. In Boston
many workers were taking vacations while stores and service
industries clamored for help. On the whole, New Eng]_and ± s
in excellent position to meet the reconversion emergency.
An estimated 80 percent of wartime workers will be kept for
peacetime productions. With fewer "war baby plants than any
' 1.
other area, the East was in good shape to reconvert speedily.
In Detroit 200,000 workers were made jobless in a
week with 50,000 more drawing their final paychecks within
a week. In San Francisco and other large cities on the We st
Coast some $163, 000,000,000 worth of municipal work was
waiting to be done while no unemployment crisis existed.
so it followed in most of the large cities that
although some workers had been displaced the number was no
where near the prewar estimates and many jobs still were
open waiting for the oeople laid off from reconverting plants.
Reconversion of African industry progressed at such
1. Newsweek, September 3, 1945 p. 30
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a rate that in January 1946, Paul G . Hoffman, Chairman for
the Committee for Economic Development said that the re-
conversion was so far ahead of schedule that 52,000,000
workers were employed in civilian jobs and only 2,000,000
were unemployed while hundreds of thousands of jobs were
still unfilled, ^e said that production and employment
were at their highest peacetime level in our history with
1.
reconversion 90 percent complete in most parts of the country.
Because the government has so much invested in war
plants and machinery it was necessary for the government to
set up policies to disoose of them during reconversion, he
government wartime investment in new plants and new machinery
amounts to approximately $15,500,000,000 but about one third
of this amount is invested in plants especially designed for
the manufacture of munitions which could have little or no
2.
peacetime use. As a result of the government s investment
it owns about twenty percent of the country *s industrial
plants including 90 percent of all aircraft caoacity, about
98 nercent of synthetic rubber, almost all of magnesium, and
a large piece of aluminum and shipbuilding capacity. *t has
an important position in steel, chemicals, machine tools,
machinery, and electric equipment. Indeed about one third
of the country
f
s metal-working and chemical facilities are
•3.
government owne d
1. New York T^mes, January 13, 1946 p. 1
2. Byrnes, James, Vital Speeches of the D ay, ^ay 1, 1944,
PpSft 435-7
3. Public Affairs C0mmittee, Inc., Reconversion N.Y. p. 18
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Most of the government -owned plants are big. ^fre
average cost is $6,000,000 and $70 out of every $100 is in
plants averaging $10,000,000 or more. Obviously, small
companies have neither the cash nor managerial caoacity to
i.
buy facilities of this size.
Also, not all these government plants have peace-
time possibilities. Nearly $6,000, 000,000 has been invested
in plants useful only for war production smokeless powder,
special steel products, amunitions and shipyards. Most of
these lost their value in reconversion though there has been
some talk of using shipyards for building prefabricated houses.
Some of these single purnose facilities will be scrapned while
others will he held as stand-by for future wars. S0me attempts
2.
have been made to sell all or part to private industry.
The Reynolds Metals Co., has rented from the gov-
ernment two plants with no government subsidy of any kind
involved. The Reynolds Metal C 0# , will assume any losses from
operation and will pay rent of $6,000,000 minimum and $72,000,
000 maximum for five years depending on the proportion of the
3.
productive capacity of the plant that is used.
Despite last minute efforts of the Reynolds Metal
Co., to lease the Mead aluminum reduction plant and the
Trentwood rolling mill near Spokane, Washington, the war
1. Public Affairs Committee, p. 20
2. Ibid, p. 19
3. Business 7'eek, December 15, 1945 p. 7
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Assets Corporation turned over these plants to Henry J .
Kaiser in February 1946 even at a possible lower return on
the theory that it would foster competition in industry.
Meade will be leased to Kaiser Cargo, ^c., on a
sliding scale ranging from $208,000, the first year, during
which two potlines will be available, to $1,248,000 the fifth
year when there will be six potlines available.
Trentwood ! s lease to Kaiser, Frazer Corp., is based
upon 5 percent of gross sales for the first five years, with
a minimum increasing from 1250,000 the first year to $2,000,
000 the fourth, Rental the fifth year will be $2,667,000,
However, if the government f s rental the first four years fail
to total $10,668,000 Kaiser will pay 5 percent of sales until
1.
the deficit is made up.
Hence it can be seen that the government is help-
ing industry and itself by leasing plants to private industry.
The policies that the governmemt has taken toward these plants
that it owns has gone a long way to make reconversion pro-,
gress quickly and hence to help absorb the men and women put
out of work because of cantract termination,
A. CONTRACT TERMINATION
The biggest problem of all was the straightening
out of the intricate network of subcontracts that spread
throughout the industry, *n the rush of termination claims
1. Business We©k, March 2, 1946, p. 52
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and plant clearance requests that followed the collapse of
Japan, there was no more time for abstract planning and
experiments. When the rush began to subside, Robert H . Hench-
ley, director of Contract Settlement, was able to reoort
that the termination program was going along nicely, Accord-
ing to Henchley's figures 303,000 prime contracts involv-
ing commitments of $64, 000,000,000 have been terminated
since the start of war production. Of these about 250,000
represent commitments of $30, 000,000,000 which had been
1.
settled by the end of 1945.
In some resoects this is a better score than it
looks. The contracts that are still unsettled generally are
the big ones involving complicated inventories and an in-
tricate set of claims from subcontractors. Of the 53,000
contracts that were unsettled at the end of 1945 about
18,000 were covered by claims that had been filed but not
yet approved.
All in all termination officials estimate that
considerably less than 5 percent of the 168,000 unsettled
contracts pending at v- J cay or terminated since then will
still be hanging at the end of 1946. AS ide v from a few fixed
price contracts that involve particularly tough technical
problems, the last to be finished probably will be the cost-
2.
plus contracts.
1. Business Week, February 2, 1946 p. 23
2. Ibid, p. 24
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From April 1945 to the end of that year, termina-
tion offices received 13.% 000 requests for olant clearance
— 103,000 of them after V_J Dav . By the year's end, offici-
als had acted on 107,000 of these requests and in the final
quarter of 1945 only 5.3 percent of the plant clearances
lasted longer than the sixty days the law allows the govern-
ment to get its property out of the contractor ? s shop. Hench-
ley estimates that by the end of 1945 the plant clearance
job was roughly half done.
Henchley figures that contractors have in February
1946 roughly $3,500,000,000, tied up in unsettled war contracts.
Tq help carry this they have $890,000,000 in partial payments,
$30,000,000 in special termination loans, and a large part
of the $480,000,000 outstanding in guaranteed production loans,
with $600,000,000 in advance payments.
From these facts it can readily be seen that contract
termination is being handled in such a manner as to help
spread the reconversion of industry.
B. SOUTHERN EXPANSION
For the first time since the V/ar between the states
almost any native of the Deep South who wants a .lob can get
one. The region may not have a proportionate share of war-
time industry but it has achieved a degree of industrializa-
tion unheard of five years ago. *t is a step toward what the
S0titherners wanted for years a broad economic basis for
1. Business Week, February 2, 1946 p. 24
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the solution of apparently Insoluble problems like their
tobacco roads and race questions .&ut now that they have it,
they are worried about how they will keep it and expand it
in the face of what they regard as obstacles from the out-
1.
side.
Southerners insist that the handicaps on increas-
ed industrialization are most un.iust. °ne handicap is the
freight rate structure, which not only keeps southern
industry from competing in northern markets, but discourages
entrepreneurs from starting industries except as employees
of cheap labor and hence at the cost of S 0uthern buying
power. Another handicap is the Nortb's almost complete
financial control of the south. The SoUth has been a victim
of absentee ownership ever since the Civil ^ar, and northern
controlled industries have done as much as any other factor
to perpetuate southern social customs which northern commen-
tators find so reprehensible.
The government's investment in plants and facil-
ities in the ^eep south from the war s beginning through
February 1943 amounted to $1,100,000,000 or 7 percent of
the national investment in war plants during the same period.
The low 7 percent is partly compensated for by the fact that
the S0uth may have a bigger proportion of the nation's chem-
3.
ical and metal working plants than it had before the war.
1. Fortune, July 1943 pps. 95-100
2. Ibid. Op. cit., p. 95
3. Ibid, P. 95
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By the end of the war in August 1945 the ^o^th's
government investment was 81 percent of all war facilities
construction and 58 percent of its wartime growth in employ-
1.
ment was directly connected to war needs.
A blind postwar trend back to the farm may occur
as contracts are cancelled and many put out of work. The
trouble with farming is that it probably can never employ
all the southern farmers efficiently. Postwar developments
of farm machinery will doubtless make them more efficient
and throw thousands into unemployment. It seems imperative,
therefore, to maintain and increase the level of the South'
s
2.
industrialization.
Hence, the South by whatever comparative test
emerged through the war with more social changes and more
unfinished business than any other sector of the country.
It has fewer share -croppers and more welders and nipe fitters.
It has an agriculture with relatively less plowing and hoe-
ing but more sowing. It has more industrv and industrial
caoital with less rural isolation and more urban sophisti-
cations. It has more than a 1,000,000 men and women in the
3.
ranks of organized labor.
*t will not be easy to cushion the business dis-
ruption that will accompany the withdrawal or drastic re-
duction of the personnel in the large military establish-
1. Business Week, March 2, 1946, p. 85
2. Fortune, Op. cit., P. 95
3. Nixon, H.C # , Virginia Quarterly Review, July 1944, pps.
321-34.
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ments which have spread over the SoUth. his will affect
wholesale and retail merchandizing, hotels and restaurants,
and a host of service activities.
*t will take more than wishful thinking or efforts
of individual Congressmen to convert expansive ordinance
plants, power factories, and munition depots into peace-
time establishments with commensurate employment. The S0uth
cannot return to its traditional reliance on cotton economy
in the face of national and world competition from other
»
fibers, and in the face of competition from non^American
1.
cotton.
The real postwar hope for Southern economic ex-
pansion lies in the diversified development of physical and
human resources in the creation of goods and services with
the South at the same time increasing its own consumption
2.
power with its increased production.
What the S0uth needs is a long-range reconver-
sion program which would put farming on a more efficient and
more profitable basis, thereby stimulating the growth of
non-agricultural industries and thus creating an opportunity
for more farm prople in industry. , This reconversion and
industrialization program would require an increase of
5,000,000 in nonfarm employment in the South, that is from
8,000,000 in 1940 to 13,000,000 in the middle fifties. The
1. Nixon, H. C., Virginia Qusrterlv Review July, 1944, p. 321
2. Ibid, p. 321

67.
bulk of the increase would be in the manufacturing industries,
1.
in trade and service occupations.
To bring 5,000,000 more workers into Southern
industry — to more than double the per capita income of the
Southern farm and industrial population, to raise the level
of health and lining standards of a third of our total popu-
lation — and to bring these results about through billions
of dollars of orivate investments, with Federal stimulation
where needed, this, indeed," is an exciting peacetime task.
*f the South can meet this challenge it will be helping
immeasurably to guarantee continued full employment for all
2.
the nation.
1. Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 51
2. Ibid, p. 51
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CHAPTER V
PUBLIC WORKS AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
Most of the experts agree that whether or not we
shall be able to maintain employment on a full employment
scale will depend on whether we expand our national output
of goods and services 50 percent over the output of 1939,
our last peacetime year. An other words, the national in-
come must be maintained at a level not far below that of
our war days. Since government will be out of the buying
market a large gap will be left wMcb must be filled. For
the fiscal year that ended June 30, 1945 the government
expenditures amounted to $100,405,000,000. An estimate
made for the 1946 fiscal vear shows a decrease in govern-
mentspending with a probable total of #67,160,000,000.
Although we would like to think that industry would be able
to take up the decrease in government buying by expansion
and larger consumer buying yet it is not probable. The
timing of public activities then seems to be one step to
reduce the intensity of booms and depressions.
There are many projects in which the government
will undoubtedly invest its money as soon as they can be
put into work. How man 7 .1obs will the government have to
suooly? No one knows, of course, but the census of opinion
among postwar planners in government, in industry, and in
1. O'Brien, ^nhn c * °P« cit. p. 132
2. U.S.News, January 4, 1946, p. 21
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the trade associations, is that we must lose no time in blue-
printing a public works program to make not less than 5,000,
1.
000 lobs a year during the years 1946 and 1947.
The general upward trend in public employment and
payrolls between 1929 and 1939 may be expected to reappear
during 1946 and 1947, following- a brief period in which
curtailment of federal activity will cause total government
employment and payrolls to fall from wartime levels. Because
of the underlying prewar tendency, however, federal employees,
2.
averaging 2,910,000 a month in 1944 and 3,800,000 persons in
1945, is not likely to drop to the 1939 figure of 888,400
persons, or 'even to fall as low as a 1,000,000 persons. The
fact and the prospects of an upward spurt in state and local
activity will mean that the gradual increase in total public
employment after the war will probably be resumed from levels
' 3.
higher than those established in 1939.
State and local governemnts accounted for well
over three quarters of total public employment in 1939 but
T
only a little over half in 1944. hey will probably resume
their prewar importance. This period of 1929 to 1939 is of
special importance in considering the postwar outlook for
governmental employment because the long-term tendencies
4.
then is evidence that it in all probability will reaopear.
1.
Sparkes, B &at. Eve. post, January 15, 1944 p. 17
2. Monthlv Labor Review, October 1945, p. 810
3. Ibid, February 1945, p. 243
4. xbid, p. 243
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T^e oeak of federal employees was reached in August 1945
1.
when 3,800,000 persons were employed by the s-overnment.
After the war ended in August 1945 we had a slight decrease
in the numbers employed and October 1945 found us with
2.
3,533,657 persons in federal employ with the number in
3.
December 1945 being reduced to 3,477,398 persons. Hence it
is evident that we shall have a falling off of these employ-
ees in the first oostwar period of 1946.
However, after this period, when industry is try-
ing to get on its feet and expand to a war time economy,
there will follow the oeriod when business will level off
and people again will be unemployed. The notion that busi-
ness by itself can oromptly nut us on a postwar yearly
income of I130, 000, 000, 000 to $140,000,000,000 and employ
40,000,000 or more oersons is not very sound. We shall
have to get along with less income and fewer people at gain-
ful work. Public works then admittedly can take care of only
a fraction of the postwar employment problem but it is an
exceedingly important factor. *t can help in the oeriod
when men who have won the war for us will be looking around
helolessly unless the government anticipates their problems
4.
and is ready to meet them.
The creation of postwar .jobs by public works will
1. Monthly Labor Review, October 1945 p. 810
2. Ibid, December 1945, p. 1250
3. Ibid, February 1946, p. 329
4. American c ity, February 1944, p. 5
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be easier than in the depression because there is much on
every side of us that needs to be done, during the war
years many important public enterprises have been slighted
because of the demands of the war efforts. T0wns, cities,
and states have let both new projects and repairs slide
for the duration. New roads will have to be built and old
ones repaired.
It is generally accepted that the most important
single element of public construction will be highways,
roads, and street works. The total of all new highways and
related construction may be estimated at an average of
$1,300,000,000 per year at the 1940 price level. It is
most important that we do put this much into our postwar
highways for it is very evident that our auto roadways
have lagged far behind the improvements in our cars.
Economically, our lack of real rapid-transportation is
crippling. When traffic arteries are so blocked that people
store their cars away instead of driving them, consumption
of almost every industrial product declines, along with our
2.
chances of achieving our postwar aim of full employment.
A congressional resolution in October 1945 re-
leased the first $500,000,000 for allotment by the Public
Roads Administration for expenditure during the fiscal year
ending ^une 30, 1947. Under the 1944 law $225,000,000 a
1. Monthly Labor Review, April 1945, p. 728
2. Longmire, C., Collier s, December 29, 1945, p. 14
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year of the federal money will be allotted a year for
regular federal aid roads, with $150,000,000 for secondary
and feeder roads and $125,000,000 for arterial highways
through urban areas. state And local governements will
spend an annual minimum of $200,000,000 on new road build-
ing and $700,000,000 on maintenance and reoair of exist-
ing roads. Maintenance and reoair work, using proportion-
ately little material is the first activity to get under
2.
way.
But there are many broader ormortunities than
individual public works. There also exists certain projects
and opportunities for investment of capital whicb do not
offer a chance of profits large enough to attract private
capital, or even 100 percent return of envestment. Yet they
involve utilization of resources and manpower, improve
standards of services which will contribute to national
health and productivity, and in many cases, the stimula-
tion or outlet for private investment, Such projects are
suitable undertakings for the o-overnment. ^hey can round
out the developemnt of a healthy, productive society, fill-
ing in the craps left out by profit motivated system of
private enterprise, and contributing to the fullest uses
of all our resources and the improvement of the standards
of living. Ty,is is not a new role for government. Activity
1. Business Week, January 12, 1946, p. 52
2. M0nthly ^abor Review, Fenruary 1945, p. 261
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of this category has been a crowing part of the business of
government since early days. In the field of services, public
education, care of destitute and dependent persons are examples
of ways in which we are accustomed to see government play its
part in the economy. What is needed now is not a new system
but a clear realization and bold determination to push gov-
ernmental enterprise into lines where it is needed and can
1.
be most helpful in achieving those ends we seek.
A. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Schools are the public buildings most urgently
needed. One educational authority has estimated that there
is an extremely urgent need for capital expenditures of at
least $3,000,000,000 within the years 1945 to 1950 for
public schools and colleges. An additional capital expend-
iture of $4,000,000,000 during this period would be proper,
the remainder being for equipment, architectural services,
and in some cases, land. The est5.mate includes rural schools,
urban schools below college level, and public colleges and
2.
universities. It is very evident that we need many more
teachers and we need them better trained and better quali-
fied. There is much room for improvement in school build-
ings and their equipment. we may well look forward to a
continually increasing expenditure for education and train-
1. National Resources Planning Board, "Postwar Planning",
U.S. Government Printing Office, washington, Set)t. 1942
2. Monthly Labor Review, Aoril 1945, p. 728
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ing, which if wisely made, will result in an improvement in
the quality of our people and an increase in their capacity
to produce wealth. 'Tne goal for all our educational efforts
must be the provision of training for every child and youth,
the kind best adapted to his abilities and in the amount
calculated to develop his maximum usefulness to himself, his
community, and society. W e know that we are yet far short of
2.
reaching this goal.
B. HEALTH PROGRESS
The second of our immediate postwar needs is
health which would mean a nationwide hospital construction
program. Sickness and disability in the u*. S. cost us some
2,000,000 man-years of working time every year, or more than
3.
^5,000,000,000.
Surgeon General Thomas Parran of the United Spates
Public Health Service estimates that the nation needs the
4.
following new hospital facilities and replacements '
166,000 beds for general hospitals
191,000 beds for hospitals for nervous and mental
diseases
44,000 beds for tuberculosis hospitals
Hospitals will probably be built to the extent of about
$75,000,000 per year to include sanitoriums and mental
1. "Dennison, Henry S and others, "Toward Pull Employment",
McGraw-Hill, New *ork, 1938, p. 43
2. National Resources Planning Board, Op. cit., p. 18
3. Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 41
4. Ibid, p. 43
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hospitals. The Veteran f s Administration plans an annual
expenditure of 1*20,000,000 for veteran's hosnitals alone
which will probablv be replacements of temporary hosoitals
1.
built during the war.
But building more hospitals and expanding health
services does not solve all our oroblems. We must find a way
to meet the cost of medical care in serious and prolonged
illness. If illness can easily consume all of the savings
of a family in comfortable circumstances, what chance has
a family in the low-income group*
Our program to secure for everyone the help which
our modern science and our national resources make possible
should be the following J
a. steady work in healthful surroundings at
wages that supoort a decent diet and health-
ful standard of living.
b. adequate public health service everywhere
c. health insurance under wMch each person
contributes his share toward supporting
public facilities, and takes out insurance to
pay for medical and hosoital care when needed.
d. good hospital, laboratory, and medical
services accessible to everyone
e. adequate publically supported medical care
for the needy
f. fair compensation to the individuals and
agencies which furnish health and medical
services
g. adequate suooort of research to maintain and
improve the quality of service and extend the
boundaries of scientific skill and knowledge
1. W anace, Henry, Op. c it/. pps. 43-44
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According to estimates of Surgeon General Parron
the first cost for the hospital construction and facilities
would he about $2,000,000,000. *t would take about 1,000,000
man-years to build the necessary hosoitals and equipment.
About 1,000,000 continuing lobs, including some 100,000 add-
itional doctors, 300,000 nurses, and 500,000 technicians
and other assistants would be needed to keep the hospitals
going. ^om© 600,000 more persons would be needed to produce
1.
hospital supplies.
S 0me Senators would, have Congress appropriate
$2,000,000 to build the necessary hospitals over a ten year
period. Others in private life, like Henry Kaiser, suggested
that C 0ngress authorize Federal Health HoUS in^ Authority to
guarantee 90 percent of the construction costs to any group
organized sufficiently well- to raise 10 percent of the cost.
C. RECREATION
Since recreation is a very important part of every-
day living, it must be given its proner facilities. We must
build these facilities within and near our great urban
centers. Also, we must provide competent recreational leader-
ship. We know today that recreation is a matter of more than
park space and play equipment, for it is participation in
group enjoyment and group activity, development of handicrafts
1. Wallace, Henry, 0p# c it., p. 44
2. Ibid, p. 44

77.
and hobbies, community enterprises, dancing, organized
athletic events and the like. The desire of all to enjoy
and use natural locations of scenic beauty alone or in
company must be recognized and satisfied. We have made a
beginning, especially in recent years, toward achieving
these ends. *n this postwar period we shall have new
opportunities to bring recreational facilities and services
1.
to all within our national income limits.
Parks and recreational facilities consist in part
of buildings such as auditoriums, field houses and shelters,
and in part of grading, landscaping, construction of swimm-
ing pools and- beaches, and other outdoor work. The expendi-
ture level for buildings alone rose rather consistently
during the 1920* s to the oeak of $56,000,000 in 1928 and
then after the depression curtailment increased asain with
somewhat less regularity through 1939. The volume estimated
for oostwar vears is $70,000,000 per year.
D. RURAL WORKS AND LAND USE
In rural areas there are corresponding opportuni-
ties for new enterprises J concerving our soil, rebuilding
and operating our forest resources, developing the range,
and opening recreational developments. For one thing, in-
creased attention will be <?iven to the restoration and
1. National Resources Planning Board, Op. cit., p. 20
2. M0nthly Labor Review, &yyril 1946, p. 728
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development of physical resources upon which agriculture
depends. Soil conservation, flood control, reforestation,
irrigation are all required phases of a program to enable
the nation to pass on to future generations not a depleted
but an enriched soil base. In the second place, there is
a need for many new and improved public facilities for
people in rural areas: public schools, hospitals, sanitation
and recreational facilities. Thirdly, much remains to be
done to bring electric power to the nation's farms and in
1.
improving rural housing standards.
We have inherited and wastefully exploited a
country enormously rich in natural resources. It is becoming
more evident that there must be much wiser management of
our remaining resources if we are to avoid impoverishment
in the future, historically not distant. The removal
of the forest cover by careless lumbering and the loss by
fires have jeopardized our water supply and made barren
wilderness of much land which fed and regulated our streams
and which might, more wisely handled, have been a perpetual
source of timber wealth. Vast areas of once fertile farming
land have been so managed that their fertility has been
seriously depleted. A good and dependable water supply,
agriculturally good soil, and a fine forest cover are essen-
tials of an enduring civilization. We can have them only at
2.
the cost of increased public expenditure.
1. National Resources Planning Board, Op. cit., p. 20
2. Dennison, Henry, Op. cit., p. 49

79.
There is from four to five years work for a
1,000,000 men in this long-needed program of soil conserv-
ation, drainage, and irrigation, and in restoration of
range land. There is also four to five years work for a
1,000,000 men in forest conservation and in developing
recreational facilities in our national and state forests.
There are more than 6,000,000 rural homes without electri-
city, which is a potential market for more than $5,000,000,
000 worth of line construction, installations, electrical
appliances and equipment. This would provide close to
1.
1,000,000 jobs for three years.
The purposes to be served including improvement
of navigation, flood control, soil improvement, irrigation,
and the generation, transmission, and distribution of elec-
tric power will necessitate an average volume of $350,000,000
annually for the vears 1946 to 1950 with a range from $275,
2.
000. 000 in 1946 to $400,000,000 in 1950.
E. WATER RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Many plans exist for the development of water
resources and industrial developments as it is believed that
the undeveloped resources of the U. S. provide material for
vast increases in our normal income and for significant
changes in the growth of industries and areas. But plans need
1. Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 45
2. Monthly Labor Review, ADrii 1945, Op. cit., p. 728
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to be tied together and put in orderly programs if they are
to be effective as stimuli for both the social and economic
1.
progress of industries and areas in the U.S.
In essence, the Tennessee Valley Administration is
a specific device of administration for rebuilding the old
frontiers for thousands of men and women right where they
live, These are areas of activity in which the full benefits
can be achieved only through Federal exploitation of the
resources as a whole. If this holds true in the development
of such a river as the Tennessee, then it must hold true for
the Missouri, °hio, the Mississippi, and other valleys be-
tween the Aneghenies and the Rockies, Achievement of some
of the major benefits, su^h as provision of a navigable
channel and control of destructive flood waters is clearly
outside the realm of private enterprise, because these
activities are not income -producing in the commercial sense.
Private enterprise, whatever its size or its virtues, is not
equipped to provide such benefits which must pay for them-
selves in public security and well-being and do not produce
2.
immediate monetary profits. It is, therefore, the 1ob of
a regional agency to provide a liaison between the people
of the region and the resources upon which they depend for
2.
prosperity. It is estimated that there is between $25,000,
000. 000 and -130,000,000,000 worth of work in river-valley
1. National Resources Planning Board, Op. cit., p. 16
2, Wallace, Henry, Op. c it., p. 46
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developments like the Tennessee Valley Administration which
1
is enough to keep 1,000,000 men working for ten years.
Hence it can he seen that if we are faced with the
presence of mass unemployment some sort of federal works will
probably be used to employ these millions. Our experience in
the 1930' s convinced a large number of people that the gov-
ernment should have a long-range, carefully thought-out, use-
ful orogram ready to be put under construction when the un-
2
employed are referred to the federal government.
However, the main trouble with public works is that
they tend to become political in nature and are frequently
adopted even though they are economically wasteful. Govern-
ment reforestration projects create wealth, great bridge and
causeway developments create wealth, and they may as well be
built in slack times as good times, taking advantage of low-
er prices and giving needed employment. But any attempt to
create a perpetual public works program in order to guarantee
full employment would be disastrous to our economy. It would
tend to freeze at a high level all the inflated prices, and
the inefficient practices which at times demand correction.
The government would in that case constantly step into the
market to buy materials and to employ labor at the prevail-
ing prices, thus preventing the system from making adiust-
3
ments essential to its health.
The reason the government is an inadequate job
1. Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 45
2. Strong, M. , Current History, January 1946, pps. 24-30
3. Pertig, L. , American Mercury, February 1944, p. 227
r
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creator is that it cannot, by its very nature, generate as
creative ideas as individuals who depend on their own efforts
for a living. Our society will create enough jobs for full
employment when men's ideas are flowing freely and find ready
access to the money, materials, and manpower. When there is
a healthy adjustment among all these ingredients, full employ-
ment is the by-Droduct. It is a poor thing, a dangerous thing
1.
as an end in itself. Hence, public works as a creator of jobs
must be carefully selected and carried out.
We might also ask where the government is going to
get the money to finance all these projects. Since the gov-
ernment snends its borrowed money on projects that do not
produce revenue they receive no return on their investment.
At this moment our national debt is $262,000,000,
000. When the government started to borrow to make work in
1953 the debt was only $21,000,000,000 but when the war came
the government, in just five years, piled its debt up to
$262,000,000,000. Tne interest alone on this debt is now
$6,000,000,000 per year which is more than the government
spent in any oeace year prior to 1934 and more than the
Treasury ever received in any peace year prior to 1941.
However, unless there are jobs in private industry,
the government necessarily will provide the jobs. But if the
government has to assume the responsibility of* providing such
1. Life, March 5, 1945, p. 32
2. Plynn, J. T., Reader's digest, January 1946, pps. 10-14
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jobs, providing them not just as a relief measure but as a
proposition, our system of individual enterprise will be
through and with that will go our system of free democratic
1
government. If governmental plans to create full employ-
ment are backed by governmental borrowing then it may lead
to bankruptcy of industry and ultimately to the bankruptcy
2
of the government itself.
Hence, it may be said that people are overwhelm-
ingly for business initiative and government responsibility.
They put reliance on business for jobs and turn to govern-
3
ment for insurance only.
1. Robey R., Newsweek, May 22, 1944, p. 74
2. Plynn, J.T., Op. cit., p. 10
3. Fortune, February 1944, p. 112
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CHAPTER VI
RESEARCH AM) PULL EMPLOYMENT
One of our very greatest national resources, the
use of our special skills in scientific and specialized
investigation, has already contributed notably to techno-
logical advancement. Our hopes for ever higher standards of
lifing depend in no small part uoon the continued support
or scientific research and free inquiry. It will be possible
to intensify and develop science and technology even more
1.
extensively than in the past.
A. ROLE OP FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The federal government can nlay a most important
part in the advancement of technology. There should be es-
tablished a central technical authority of the federal
government which should co-ordinate the increasing activiti-
es of the government in scientific fields. It should not
dictate the methods to be carried out by existing federal
scientific bureaus, but should serve as a clearing house
for these organizations.
Every business and industry should have full access
to all inventions and research findings which have been
developed at the erovernment *s expense. There are also many
fields of research which are not fully covered by existing
private laboratories. Federal supoort should be made avail-
1. National Resources Planning Board, Op. cit., p. 20
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able in these fields. Mr. Wallace believes that federal
funds should support especially* (a) fundamental science,
the mother of aoplied science, upon w v ich the welfare and
prosperity of the nation rests; (b) research and development
wherever it affects national interest, such as in national
defense, public health, public housing, and the balanced
regional development of the entire nation.
Technical information for small business should
be made available by the federal governemnt through tech-
nical information offices in each state. Moreover, the state
centers should initiate research prolects of snecial import-
1.
ance to their areas.
°r. Vannevar BUsh, "Director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, set forth the following
principals in a report to President Harry Truman on federal
2.
research '
a. to create new jobs, make national defense
effective, and win everyday battles against
disease and disability, America needs a national
policy for science.
b. the government should promote new ecientific
knowledge and help develop new scientific talent
through a new agency, the ^ational Research
Foundation. This foundation would grant money
to medical schools and other research centers
working on projects which would contribute to
the public welfare or to national defense.
c. of the utmost importance, the foundation
would not be allowed to dictate internal
policy or personnel to the institutions aided.
1. Wallace, Henry Op, cit., p. 49
2. Newsweek, July 30, 1945, p. 52
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d. private industrial research would be given
its head. We must remove the rigid controls
and recover freedom of inquiry and that healthy-
competitive scientific spirit so necessary for
expansion of the frontiers of scientific
knowledge.
e. wartime scientific discoveries should be made
public as quickly as they lost military value
to the enemy. The flow of scientific information
from abroad should be reestablished and stimulated.
f. ability, not the circumstance of family fortune,
should determine who gets higher education in
science.
To begin making up an estimated deficit of 150,
000 college graduates in science and 17,000 postgraduate
specialists, ^r. BUsh recommends that the foundation
finance 24,000 scholarships and 900 postgraduate fellowships
to cost about $30,000,000 a year.
All industries, big and little, stand to benefit
from any discoveries in basic science that might result from
government financed research directed toward health, public
welfare, and national defense. There is heavy pressure in
government circles to keen our scientists mobilized permanent-
2.
ly for such research.
The basic questi&n of policy is how far government
control of science mught reach in peacetime. A compact,
standing army of the laboratory would be a great defense
asset. But at the same time, free enterprise could not exist
if the government strangled private research and inventive-
1. Newsweek, July 30, 1945, p. 52
2. Ibid, Op. cit., p. 52
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1.
ness by keeping all top scientists mobilized permanently.
However, there would be no conflict between this program
and existing private research, if we assume that competi-
tive free enterprise means the balanced growth of all
industry, and that the common goal is not scarcity, but
2.
abundance
•
B. PRIVATE RESEARCH ROLE
Postwar markets will be peculiar, What makes
tomorrow's markets peculiar is not just that they will be
different, but rather that the differences will be radical
and sudden* Norma lly the market forces emerge gradually and
experience with even the most dramatic of them shows that
they developed gradually, But the war has wrought big
changes suddenly and their oostwar impact will be felt
3.
suddenly, A. few of the more significant market factors are J
a. demand for durable and semi-durable goods
has been oent up and war savings have been
accumulated to finance them,
b, a high nostwar national income will extend
the mass market for semi-luxury goods to
vastly broader segments of the family income
scale
•
c, consumers exoect fundamentally new products
and revolution in old ones to result from
war technology
d. new durable goods will cost more than they did
before the war because of higher labor and
material costs,
1. Newsweek, July 30, 1945, °o. cit., p. 52
2. W anace, Henry, Op. cit., p, 49
3. Business We e:lc, July 29, 1944, p. 120

The greatest argument that insists on automatic
prosperity during the first postwar years is the one which
points to the marvel of science. Technical and scientific
developments during the war have created a whole range of
new products and potential new industries. The demand for
plastic houses, electronic quick freezers, and a helicopt-
er in every garage is certin to bring iobs and more .lobs,
We are now at the threshold of many new, strange
and exciting developments. Thanks to wartime scientific
progress, the American consumer will soon be living in a
1.
veritable wonderland, T^ere certainly will be new .lobs in
new fields as soon as these products can #et under way
toward production. The ground floor opportunities will go
to those with imagination and training, Some of the new
fields which will be open will include electronics, tel-
evision, wood and glass, plastics, synthetic fabrics, and
rubber, light metals, prefabricated houses, aviation, and
dehydrated and frozen foods,
Electronics is a word most of us would have
trouble defining, but it is the name of a giant who is lust
beginning to get into his stride. Radio and television are
electronic devices, Needed to create these electronic
devices, to help keep them going, and to bring the known
ones into mass production will be engineers, salesmen,
factory workers, maintenance mechanics, operators, design-
1. Perkins, John, Op. cit.,
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ers, and research men, Radio has a waiting market of
5,000,000 receivers in the year 1946 which means new broad-
casting stations each requiring technicians, directors,
writers, actors, musicians, • announcers, and engineers, ^he
recent revises allocation of the new frequency modulation
spectrum to 88-108 megacycles from 42-50 megacycles should
ultimately provide something like 10,000 broadcasting stations
1.
according to federal Communications Commission figures.
Wood is now fireproof and decay proof. It is plas-
tic. From it will come furniture which is scratchproof , fire-
proof, waterproof, alcoholproof and resistant against any home
accident. From this will come .lobs, because wood will be
able to compete with the best of plastics and light metal.
business thinks we may exoect 80 percent more plywood, and
2.
almost half again as much furniture in the postwar world.
The unit volume of the furniture industry was down about 40
percent from 1941 to 1944 but its dollar volume for the same
3.
period was only down 10 to 12 percent. Its sales for 1946
4.
are predicted to increase at 20 percent. While this indust-
ry hopes for a 50 percent in its sales during 1947 and 1948.
Class is now almost unbreakable, light, and with
the structural strength of steel. Glass will share the com-
ing building boom since prefabricated housing proved what it
1. Business Week, November 10, 1945, p. 32
2. Huff, D., Liberty Magazine, Nov
., 3, 1945, p. 101
3. Business Week, January 19, 1946, p. 26
4. Ibid, P. 26
5. xbid, p. 28

90
could do in meeting our war emergencies, it too will have
a growing place in the home building boom. This will mean
opportunities for architects, designers, salesmen, real
estate men decorators, and all kind of merchandisers.
Plastics have grown tremendously in importance in
two decades, In 1922 only 5,000,000 pounds were produced.
In 1942 there were 490,000 oounds produced, and in 1944 the
sales value of plastics and svnthetic resins was 3>332, 000, 000.
Far from coming out of the war with surplus capacity
manufacturers of plastic material cannot meet current demands.
They plan to invest $107,000,000 in new plant facilities as
soon as the machine, tools, and building industry can provide
the materials. T-^is will increase capacity by 303,000,000
pounds a year to make it one third more than it was on V_J
2.
Day.
The chemical industry in turn jumped its production
from Il2, 000, 000, 000 in 1939 to $22,000,000,000 in 1944 and
they are now ready to spend about three times the $275,000,
3.
000. paid in 1939 for new production facilities.
If the development of prefabricated plastic and
aluminum houses, for example, helps break down the net work
of restrictions which have so greatly hampered a real boom
in home -building, then we can look for new business activity
and new 1obs. But to the extent that plastics merely replace
1. Modern Plastics. January 1946, p. 92
2. Business Week, &arch 2, 1946 p. 50
3. Ibid, March 9, i94 6> p# 56
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steel and glass or magnesium replaces iron, there will be
no immediate increase in employment. There will be more
.1obs in plastic factories, but fewer in the steel and glass
plants and, therefore, whatever gains are made in one indus-
i.
try are likely to be largely offset by losses in another.
Producing, packaging, and distribution of the new
debulked, dehydrated, and frozed foods to world markets are
already pointing to new lobs in food industries. The estimate
increase in the foods is from $10,618,000,000 worth of food
in 1939 to $14,185,600,000 worth of food at 1939 prices in
2.
1946 which is a jump of just a little more than one third.
In answering a questionnaire sent out by the Committee for
"Economic development the food products industry estimated
3.
their postwar market would have an increase of 36.3 percent.
The frozed foods industry is still in its infancy.
Only 1 percent of the fruits and 0.35 percent of the vegeta-
bles eaten in the u*. S. are frozen. HoWever, today people eat
twice as much frozen foods than they were eating in 1940.
Despite the industry 1 s growth consumption of frozed fruits
and vegetables is barely one twelfth that of canned goods
and far less than one-hundreth that of fresh food. These
figures leave room for a potential expansion that has led
the ootomistic person into fantastic prediction of the
4.
future of frozed foods. The market for home freezers in
1. Lebergott, s ., Op. cit., p. 194
2. Huff, D
. ,
Op. cit, „ p. 100
3. Time, August 27, 1945, p. 86
4. Business week, February 2, 1946, p. 74
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1946 is estimated at 500,000 units which will be sold
1.
mostly to suburban areas and farms.
Aviation seems to be one of the most extensive
fields for new ,1obs, The Civil Aeronautics Administration
predicted in October 1945 that by 1955 civil aviation could
provide more than 750,000 new jobs. It added that 2,800,000
families will be able to afford both an airplane and an
2.
automobile •
Hence there are likely to be many new jobs for
pilots and other flight and technical ground personnel in
air transportation and related services, Nevertheless, . the
jobs available will be far too few to employ the tremendous
number of veterans and others who will be seeking these types
of 1'obs. An oversupnly of labor is expected in practically
all aviation occupations, but the surplus of qualified
applicants will be much less, and the chances of finding
work correspondingly greater in some types of lobs than in
others
•
For some of the occupational groups such as flight
engineers, navigators, flight radio operators, stewardesses,
dispatchers, employment opportunities exist only with the
air lines. New lobs of these types are not likely to exceed
9,500 in all aviation industries for the years 1945-1950,
a figure only one twenty-fifth as great as the number of
1. Business Week, February 23, 1946, p. 74
2. Boston Post, October 31, 1945
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1.
men with comparable duties now in the armed forces.
However, pilots and aircraft mechanics on the
other hand will find jobs with less difficulty. As thous-
ands of them will be employed by the nonscheduled flying
services, which are active at many civilian airports. Oil
and other companies using planes for business purposes
also have pilots and mechanics on their payrolls. However,
the greatest number of new .lobs for pilots both with the air
lines and in other fields, which can be anticipated by the
year 1950 is only 32,000 and in contrast there were some
2.
200,000 pilots in the armed forces.
The petroleum industry in America will employ more
peoole than it did before the war. Greatest increase in em-
ployment will come in fields of distribution, both of present
products and new ones, and in the great backlog of construct-
ion and equipment manufacture halted by wartime shortages,
Before the war, the industry directly employed about 1,200,
000 with something like 750,000 in distribution, wholesale
and retail marketing, and in allied pursuits, ^rilling and
production employed some 160,000. The oil companies expect
to retain all present jobs, rehire most of their employees
who have been in military service, and provide almost 250,
000 new 1obs for veterans who will be newcomers to the
3,
petroleum industry.
1. Monthly Labor Review, June 1945, p. 1186
2. Ibid, p. 1186
3. Nation s Bus i_ness, November 1945

94.
One of the biggest new industries to come out of
the war is synthetic rubber. By July 1946, Chairman William
I*. Batt of the Washington Interagency Policy Committee on
Rubber hopes to place specific proposals before C nngress
to attain the objectives that this group has laid down for
synthetic rubber. This group has recommended that the U.S.
should keep and produce 250,000 long tons of synthetic
rubber a year. Facilities to turn out another annual 350,000
lone- tons should be held in standby condition for operation
only in case of another rubber emergency. This 600,000 ton
capccity (half of the $700,000,000 synthetic total built
during the war) should <?o into private ownership and opera-
tion in the long run. until this transfer can be made the
government should take the responsibility for it and pay for
1.
it.
With all these prospects for our industries after
the war it must be realized that one of the most important
things this country must do is to foster a healthy birth
rate of new businesses, if we are to be ready for the great
changeover in production, ^ew enterprises must be given
freedom from taxes for about three to five years. 0r these
businesses might be taxed more lightly than old, less dar-
ing concerns, for a certain time. Special provisions might
also be made for the averaging of losses by new firms over
a five year rather than a twelve month calendar, ^tiese Job
1. Business Week, N0vember 1945
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makers assume the risks and forsake the security of regular
wages to stand on their own feet hoping to make money for
themselves, but even if losing money, providing a regular
wage and a regular job to one or more other persons. Our
responsibility to the lob maker then is to reduce his risk
1.
as much as possible.
If these new fields, which are now only comparati-
vely small industries, are to expand and hence give more
.1ob opportunities for employment, it is most important that
we help to foster them instead of hindering their expansion.
The potential expansive power of private enterprise is great.
The reservoirs of energy must not be sealed but released.
The principal restraint needed is to make certain that
excesses of enterprise, leading into unproductive and des-
2.
tructive speculation do not destroy that productive energy.
1.
Baldwin, R., Op. c it., p. 17
2. Flanders, R • E., N.Y. Times Magazine, NoVember 18, 1945,
p.
8
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CHAPTER VII
FOREIGN TRADE AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
Pew economists would, contend that we could have
a high level of employment without a high level of foreign
trade. Exports can bear a substantial part of consumption
of American produced goods after home demand has been
satiated.
In the orewar period, and particularly in the 1930 ! s
exports did not make the required contribution. Government
economists have estimated that much larger export trade is
possible in this postwar era than in the 1930 f s America has
products which the rest of the world needs, the rest of the
1.
world has products which America needs.
It is urged at one extreme, that increased foreign
trade is indispensible to full employment. Foreign trade in
this contest usually means experts for it is apparently
assumed that the domestic market is satiated and that foreign
markets are necessary if the great productive capacity of
this country is to be used and its output absorbed. T^e
production increment is then usually translated into man-
hours of employment by a simple arithmetic calculation. The
U.S. Bureau of ^abor Statistics reports that in 1939 when
the volume of goods exported by this country was $3,300,000,
000, approximately 960,000 persons we^e employed directly
1. Perkins, John, Op. cit.
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and indirectly in nonagricultural industries in the produc-
tion of export goods, ^hen allowance is made for increased
productivity since 1939 and the considerably higher prices
in which the future exports from this country will he pro-
bably expressed, the difficulty of obtaining the volume of
exports required to produce 5,000,000 ,1obs frequently held
to be obtainable through foreign trade can be readily app-
1.
reciated.
The tremendous volume of wartime capital invest-
ment in new plants and equipment has inflated the capacity
of the American economy, and therefore, its demand for new
outlets to an entirely unprecedented scale.
The country recognizes that the change which the
war has produced in this respect. Not only economists and
professional and interested observers of economic matters,
but public opinion in general recognizes the new unbalance
which has developed between domestic production capacity
and effective immediate domestic demand. Without signifi-
cant exception, every group comprising public opinion
agrees that after the war the U. S. must produce no end of
exports
•
There is a errowine acceptance of the revolution-
ary fact that each year a volume of merchandise tremendous
enough to account for as much as 30 percent of American
1. Monthly Labor Review, NoVember 1945, p. 858
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1.
employment and 10. to 15 percent of total business, must
leave the country's shores.
America's postwar foreign policy will, therefore,
have to try to appease two potent pressures. At one and the
same time it will have to find customers for an unprecedent-
ed volume of business, and it will have to arrange for these
customers to accomodate American opinion bv buying its sur-
2.
plus at a profit to American producers.
*t is therefore self evident that foreign trade and
domestic trade are one and inseparable and that we cannot ex-
pect domestic prosperity under our system without a constant-
ly expanding trade with other nations and between other
nations
•
To keep prosperity levels of employment, product-
ion, and income to reach the goal of full employment, we
shall have to find increasing markets for our production
and increasing investment outlets for our capital. If there
is anyone who believes that, in the immediate future, these
market and investment opportunities exist or in prospect in
this country alone they have not made themselves known.
According to the department of C^merce, a full
employment economy might provide $10,000,000,000 of exports
annually. This compares with around $2,000,000,000 of exports
annually in the 1930 ! s. This volume would mean nearly
1. Perkins, John, Op. cit.,
2. Janeway, E., Asia and the Americas, %y- June 1944, p. 195
3. New Republic, January 22, 1945, p. Ill
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3,000,000 iobs in industry and foreign markets for the agri-
cultural output of about 1,000,000 people more. When you
compare these .lobs with the number of men and women who are
returning to this peacetime work from our fighting forces
in amounts to nearly one half. Hence the importance of
1.
foreign trade begins to emerge.
How will we account for $10, 000, 000, 000 worth of
2.
foreign trade? We will do this by the following J
a. exports to pay for imports at 6, 000, OpO, 000
a full employment income
b. reduction of tariffs — further 1,000,000,000
rise of imports and corresponding
gain in exports
c. a rise of export prices 1,000,000,000
d. foreign investment 2.000.000.000
TOTAL 10,000,000,000
To maintain the requisite level of production we
must take advantage of all sound opportunities for invest-
ment which will promote economic develooment and growth.
The volume of new investment and develooment which we must
have in order to maintain expanding output and employment
exceeds the outlets which we can readily find at home. The
investment of this excess abroad will make possible the
necessary level of our exports since for this period for-
eign nations will not be in a position to sell to us nor
we to buy imports in such a volume.
1. Achesen, D., Vital Speeches of the Day, Feb. 15, 1945, p. 263
2. New Republic, 0n . c it., p. Ill
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However, we cannot have exports without imports and
therefore in evaluating the effect on increase but balanced
foreign trade upon domestic employment, one must compare the
employment created by exports with that displaced by imports.
The degree offset may be said to depend in general upon three
things : (a.) the intensity of the demand for additional imports
(which in turn create sales for exports by placing dollars in-
to the hands of purchasers in other countries) at any given
level of purchasing power, as compared with the intensity of
the direct demand for additional domestic products; (b ) the
amount of labor required to produce a given increment of
exports as compared with that needed to produce an equal ad-
ditional value unit of other goods for domestic markets, if
the sums used to expand exports in step with imports were
spent on domestic products instead; (c) the relative effects
of exports and imports upon secondary employment in other
parts of the economy, by way o.f the effect of added or sub-
tracted production on purchasing power, ^hese clearly are
relationships of some complexity, all of them highly perti-
nent to the question whether expended but balanced foreign
1.
trade provided a net increase in employment.
Estimates made of the amount of needed imports for
1930 have been based not only on the relationship between
imports and total U.S. business activity in past years but
1. Monthly Labor Review, November 1945
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but also uoon the competitive impact of : 1-svnthetic indus-
tries as silk and rubber; 2-the depletion, relative to needs,
of basic resources as petroleum and lumber. The National
Planning Association drew up this schedule of imports at the
1.
level of full employment in 1950.
TABLE 5. IMPORTS AT PULL EMPLOYMENT LEVEL-1950
(in millions of dollars)
COMMODITY 1929 1939 1950
Finished manufactures 770 295 800
Petroleum 97 42 750
Woodpulp and newsprint 248 201 400
Fats and oils 180 84 250
Coffee 302 140 180
Sugar 209 125 170
Rubber 241 178 160
Meat and oroducts 62 48 150
Wool 39 22 120
Tin 92 71 110
Burlaps 77 28 100
Lumber 44 20 100
Diamonds 52 35 100
Hides and skins 137 47 70
Copper 154 44 60
Silk 427 121 50
TOTALS 3,131 1,501 3,570
After estimating the import total and projecting
what now seems the probable trend in ^invisible" income
items, tourist travel, interest payments, long-term loans,
and shipping balance the National Planning Association sees
-.7,000,000,000 of exports to the rest of the world as against
1. Business Week, December 2, 1944, p. 114
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$5,200,000,000 in 1929 and $3,300,000,000 in 1937.
TABLE 6. EXPORTS AT PULL EMPLOYMENT LEVEL-1950
(in millions of dollars)
COMMODITY 1929 1939 1950
Machinery $1,693 $797 $1,000
Auto and vehicles 607 479 2,000
Other metals, manufactures 537 502 1,100
Petroleum products,
wood &paoer, chemicals,
textiles 1.729 1.111. 1.700
5,157 3,289 7,000
With smaller exports of farm commodities and a
stabilized total in other manufactures the heavy goods in-
dustries-machinery, autos, metals-would have a 150 percent
lump in exoort volume over 1929 and would account for 60
1.
percent of the 1950 total.
A. REBUILDING- EUROPE
In Europe there exists an enormous demand for
capital goods and calitap investment of the U.S. to rebuild
devastated plants and transportation and public utility
systems, as well as to produce consumer^ goods. In some
countries the destruction or removal of large quantities of
tools, equipment and livestock is greatly reducing their
capicity to produce. After World War I the U.S. greatly
helped the rest of the world make up accumulated shortages.
1. Business week, December 2, 1944, p. 114
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Our exnorts rose from $6,100,000,000 in 1918 to $7,900,000,
1.
000 in 1919 and $8,200,000,000 in 1920.
T^ere is also a need for credits to assist in re-
construction of normal monetary, fiscal, production and trade
2.
systems.
*t is, therefore, evident that our first big post-
war job abroad is to help restore some sort of order in the
devastated area, and get farm and factory production running
again. Repairing the war devastation, plus the initial
steps toward industrialization in backward countries, will
require from $55,000,000,000 to $65,000,000,000 worth of
plants and equipment in the years 1946 to 1948. Moreover,
relief needs for food and clothing will mean a continued
3.
large demand. Evei»y0ne knows today that people in Eur0pe,
especially in the war-occupied countries, are suffering from
hunger and cold and this fact alone gives American product-
ion the opportunity to send a great deal of its nroduction
abroad.
B. BUILDING UNUSED AREAS
*n other areas of the world methods of production
have lagged markedly behind those of the most advanced in-
dustrial nations and great opportunities exist for the em-
1. Siichter, S.H., Foreign Affairs, July 1943, p. 674
2. Achesen, 0p# c it., p. 263
3. Wallace, Henry, 0P . cit., p. 51
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ployment of capital, capital goods, and improved techniques
in the development of expanding and increasing productive
areas. There is no inherent reason why we should limit our
investment horizons to our own boundaries and every reason
1.
why we should not.
^atin America offers enormous possibilities for
future development. *ts wealth of metals and minerals is
vast and onlv partly explored. The U.S. government has
stimulated some progress through loans and errant s for
scientific research and development projects but the region
on a whole is in need of modern science and technology as
applied to agriculture and industry. *t is in need of cura-
tive and preventive sanitation and health measures for men,
beasts, and crops, and it is in particular need of expand-
ing facilities for education. On the physical side trans-
portation and communication facilities, water and sewerage
for many of its cities, and other public services for modern
2.
life, are needed to open the wav for future expansion.
However, the birrn-est frontier of future development
is the northern Pacific and eastern Asia. The east of Asia,
both Chinese and Russian, is expanding. Postwar stability in
China is dependent upon economic reconstruction, agricultural
well as industrial, and reconstruction in China is dependent
1. ACheson, D
.,
Op. c it., p. 236
2. Wan ace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 52
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upon trade and finance, T^is reconstruction, moreover, de-
pends upon imports from abroad, *t will require technical
and material assistance from us given on a business like
basis in the development of agriculture and industrial
facilities and technology, in scientific research, and in
1.
sanitation and public health*
America also has many possessions that could be
put to productive work if we would spend the money to bring
about this prosperity, ^n Alaska and also in our possessions
in the Pacific there are many hidden potentialities. °ne of
the biggest lobs in these areas will be the building of great
airports and roadways, Tv, ere- are also limitless new front-
iers in resources of minerals and manpower here which can
2.
be developed.
The tropics are certain to become even more imoort-
and to world trade. We can no longer remain "Commercially
neutral" as a nation while our manufacturers of rubber, drugs,
and other indespensable goods export their goods to these
countries. Our country regularly absorbs more than half the
trooical products in international — normally 55 to 60 per-
cent — and therefore has the means to keep the tropics,
3.
eastern and Americas, from becoming an area of world conflict.
What effect will this new expansion of foreign trade
1 Wallace, Henry, Op. cit., p. 54
2 Ibid, p. 54
3 Wilson, C. M., American Mercury, June 1944, p. 721
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have upon our Industrie
s
? The cotton industry is most con-
cerned with the effect that imports would have on their busi-
ness.
In America we oroduced prior to the war about 12,000,
000 bales of cotton a year and the consumption of this amount
is 40,7 pounds of cotton for every American. Exports of cotton
fell from a peak of 11,000,000 bales in 1926 to an average
of 3,000,000 for the years just before the war. This was due
to the increase of foreign production which was stimulated
by the artificially high American cotton prices. Cotton,
therefore has had t o be one of the most subsidized oroducts
1.
of the U.S. The subsidy program has succeeded in running
shipments into foreign markets to a current rate of about
2,500,000 bales annually and between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000
2.
during the war years.
Since 1941 the American cotton has usually been
about four cents a pound higher than the world price and
consequently for the vears 1938 to 1945 the annual U.S.
carry-over has averaged 10,000,000 bales and the total rose
4.
to 14,000,000 bales in 1945. In 1946 the plantings will
probably be between 20,000,000 and 27,000,000 acres which
will produce a crop of oerhaps 12,000,000 bales. Hence, if
tariffs are lowered in this country and other countries come
1. Fortune, NoVember 1945 pns . 113-114
2. Business Week, January 19, 1946, pps. 46-47
3. Fortune, Op. c it., pps. 113-114
4. Business week, January 19, 1946 pps. 46-47
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into the American market selling cotton at lower prices than
our own cotton it would lead to unemployment in this industry.
Hence, to rebuild a world trade cannot be done
simply by restroing prewar flow of goods. Large new flows of
trade must be developed to fit the new distribution of pro-
ducing capacity, the new distribution of demand, the postwar
wage and price structure. If other countries of the world
could visualize a large increase in sales to the U.S. their
fears for their export market would greatly diminish and they
would see the possibility for obtaining needed American
machinery for their factories, mines, and utilities. The U.
S. can increase its wealth and the wealth of the world by
ooening its great closed markets to trade and bringing about
1.
a more productive distribution of capitol and labor.
How shall we bring together the domestic and foreign
components of a prosperous economy'?
The first necessity is an adequate economic policy.
Fortunately there is unanimous agreement that the object of
nublic policy and private endeavor must be to assure that the
productive capacit?/- of this country, which we have proved
in time of war, shall continue to be utilized for the satis-
faction of the needs of peace with full employment and pros-
perity, free from fluctuations, and with steadily rising
1.
Slichter, S.H., The Atlantic Monthly, December 1945, p. 61
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levels of income.
The second necessity is the creation of circumstan-
ces to increase trade and economic activity throughout the
world. This includes '
a. reasonable exchange rate stability for consider-
ably longer periods of time so that traders and
investors mav have some assurance as to the money
in which they are dealing.
b. assurance that exporters will get paid for their
exports -- not in some blocked foreign currency,
but in dollars with which to pay their expenses
and distribute their profits.
c. elimination of exchange discrimination and
multiple currency systems which have diverted
trade from economic channels and have been in
use as a weapon of economic domination.
d. perhaps most important of all, the reduction
of tariffs to reasonable levels which will permit
trade to be carried on and the -progressive elimi-
nation of quotas, preferences and barriers to
trade
•
The third necessity is a sound foreign investment
policy directed toward the restoration of the devastated areas
of "Europe and the development of the productive capacity of
other areas of the world, thus raising the levels of economic
1.
activity and that of the entire world.
The U.S. government must have its part but private
lending must be stimulated to carr?/- its proper share of the
vastly increased necessity for foreign investment in this
postwar reconstruction and development.
1. Acheson, Op. cit., p. 263
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A successful carrying out of the policies outlined
above of economic development by exports of U.S. caoital and
caoital goods accompanied by like policies and programs of
other capital exporting nations should over the years result
in rapid and extensive efficiency of other nations of the
world, increase capacity of their part to export, and. chang-
ing but increasing demands for imports. It is at this point
that the full benefits of reduced barriers to trade will be
reaoed, in continued expanding markets for our exoorts, and
even more greatly increasing imports into the U.S. which will
make possible the servicing of our foreign investments.
If on the other hand we neither maintain by sound
domestic policies an increasing level of employment, oroduc-
tion, and income at home, nor reduce barriers to trade and
especially to imports into the U.S. our foreign investments
and entire foreign economic oolicy can only come to frustra-
1.
tion.
1. Achesen, D., 0D . cit., p. 263
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CHAPTER VIII
TAXES AND PULL EMPLOYMENT
Postwar tax policy must be designed to promote our
goal of full employment. A tax program which is so confisca-
tory that it is impossible to accumulate savings which may
be invested does not make for full employment. And a system
that makes it not worth while for those who already have
capital to risk it in further production or in the starting
of a new enterprise, does not make for full employment. Our
present tax system, in spite of its injustices and other
short comings, was not a significant handicap to war pro-
duction. This was due to the fact that government was willing
to take everything that was produced at a price in excess
of cost, and hence business was able to make a good profit
in spite of its taxes. But in peace time, when the govern-
ment is no longer a virtually unlimited buyer, this would
not be true. With a tax structure of this character we shall
not get private investment in the postwar period, and if we
do not get private investment we shall not get full employment.
We must reduce taxes, and reduce them quickly for only if
that is done can there be a lob for everyone who wants to
1.
work.
Postwar tax revision should give particular at-
tention to the development and preservation of adequate
1. Robey, R., Newsweek, Eebruarv 21, 1944, p. 60
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business incentives. Changes to encourage risk-taking are
nrooosed in this field. Prominent among them is reduction
of rates in the high income bracets which provides venture
capital, permission to charge capital losses against cur-
rent income and provision for tax adjustments for persons
with incomes that fluctuate widely from year to year. The
point of the tax svstem should be to leave biisiness de-
1.
cisions as mueh as possible to business discretion.
Somewhere along the line there should be con-
sideration of the question of ^ust how far the recommend-
ed tax revisions can bring us toward full employment. Of
course, tax revision is but one plank in the oostwar pro-
gram and no one can measure exactly its impact; neverthe-
less, opinion mav vary significantly as to how much hope
2.
business may olace in tax revision.
A. THE TAX yPLANS
The four leading plans nroposed for postwar taxes
are * (a) The Puml-Sonne Plan prepared by Beardsly Ruml of
R.H. Macy and H.C. S0nne a New ^ork City business man; (b
)
The Grove Plan recommended by Professor Haro id M. Gr0ves
of the University of Wisconsin; (c) The Twin City Pian
prepared under the direction of a group of St. Paul and
Minneapolis business men; (d) The Committee for ECOnomic
Development Plan.
1. Business Week, June 17, 1944, p. 124
2. Ibid, p. 124
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The Ruml-^onne P^an recommendations are * (a) un-
balanced budgets until some agreed level of high employ-
ment and high production is reached; (b ) abolition of fed-
eral income taxes on corporation, provided measures are ad-
opted at the same time to prevent the use of the corporate
form of business as a device to avoid payment of individual
income taxes and to obtain undue tax advantages over unin-
corporated businesses: (c) a small franchise tax of 5 per-
cent on corporations, (d.) reliance upon the progressive in-
dividual income tax as the chief source of federal revenus
and substantial reduction of this tax; (e) opposition to a
o-eneral sales tax; (f ) retention of the 1943 levels of ex-
cise taxation on tobacco, alcoholic beverae-es, and gasoline.
The Groves P-| an puts forth these suggestions • (a)
elimination of the federal corporation income tax as a with-
holding levy on dividends or an advance payment on income re-
tained by the corporation for reinvestments; (b ) use of the
personal income tax as the main source of federal revenue;
(c) repeal of the excess profits tax one year after the war;
(d) reduction of middle and upper individual income-tax ra-
tes; (e) opposition to the sales tax.
The Twin City Plan puts their proposals in the fo-
llowing J (a) reduction of corporate tax rates for corpora-
tions with new incomes under $50,000; (b) abolition of the
capital stock and declared value excess profits taxes; (c)
a retail sales tax of 5 percent with no exemptions; (d) re-
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auctions of the normal individual income tax rates from
13 percent to 10 nercent and the surtax rate schedule
from 13-82 percent to 6-50 percent.
The C.E.D sucre-ested ' (a) reduction of the rates
on the personal income tax on the lowest income brackets to
a standard tax of 16 to 20 percent; (b) reduction of excise
4^1 It
taxes by #3,000,000,000 or T0 the degree that revenue will
permit", and elimination of all excise taxes except those on
liquors, tobacco, and p-asoline; (c) reduction of corporate
income tax rates to 16 to 20 oercent and deduction of these
taxes from personal income as taxes collected at the source ;
1.
(d) elemination of the excess-profits tax.
The C.E.D feels that the personal income tax should
nrovide at least one half of total federal collections but
that peacetime rates must be lower than 1944 rates. The dou-
ble taxation of dividend income should be eliminated by mak-
ing the corporate income tax a withholding tax on dividends
and by subjecting dividends to surtaxes only when in stock-
holder's hands. Income from all future security issues from
state and local governments should be made fully taxable.
The high corporate level, says C.E.D. stunts the
prowth of a small company. Reaching into the stream of bu-
siness operators, the tax o-rabs vital funds where and when
they would be most likely to create more lobs, increase
1. Withers, Winiam, New Republic, 0c t. 2, 1944, p. 417
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wages or reduce the price of goods manufactures . i v.ls does
not mean that corporate earnings remaining after payment of
the rpoposed normal 16 to 20 percent tax would go free. Paid
out as dividends to individuals, such would be taxed in share-
holders 1 hands •
Excise taxes are attacked also from the viewpoint
of their effect on volume of business and therefore on iobs.
The very nature of the excise taxes, the C.E.D. points out,
imposes them principally on those gnods and services most
widel?/" in demand. A s a result, price of these soods and ser-
vices are raised. Higher prices then reduce purchasing power.
C. E.D estimates that its proposed changes in excise levies
would add ,000,000,000 to consumer purchasing power.
Two features of the C.E.D tax plan mav lay it
open to criticism from progressives. One is its declara-
tion for balancing the budget and reducing the federal debt.
Despite its insistence on a budget balanced annually the C.E.
D. would accept an increase in the federal debt "under clear
conditions of slump in industry and trade.' Tne C.E.D. main-
tains that its tax schedules would make possible sizable debt
retirement at $140,000,000,000 and a balanced budget at a
lower level of national income. But in as much as the revenue
yield of their tax plan is calculated to average only about
$18,000,000,000 at $140,000,000,000 national income the C.E.
D. would have to accept a deficit financing when national
income falls below the $140,000,000,000.
1. Time, September 11, 1944, p. 326
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The other dubious feature if the manner in which
the proposed reduction in personal income taxes is distri-
buted among; the various brackets. A declared intention is
to relieve the higher incomes in order to encourage the in-
vestment of venture capital. It will be argued that this in-
centive is less necessary to full production than an increase
in purchasing power in the low-income brackets, which will
maintain the demand for goods. The C.E.D, has not overlook-
ed this argument, however, since it has proposed some tax
relief fcr the lower brackets as well. Whether it has gone
far enough in this direction may be questioned. Certainly
more relief could be provided if a higher national income
1.
were taken as the n-oal.
However, the whole objective of the C.E.D tax plan
is high-level employment and a tax system that will result
in the maximum creation of *obs. It estimates that its tax
proposals would help business employ 56,000,000 people,
2.
40,000,000 of these paying income taxes.
This new objective of a tax system may not sould
revolutionary but it is. Everybody knows that tax policies
affect the state of business but no peacetime U.S. tax law
has ever been based on an acceptance of these fiscal facts.
Now the C.E.D. tell us that ^obs should be the key ob.i'ec-
1. New Republic, September IB, 1944, p. 326
2. Time, September 11, 1944, p. 88
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tive of tax policy; an even more important objective than
balancing the budget. T\,ey know that the pestwar federal
budget will be enormous — at least $16, 000, 000, 000 to
$18, 000,000,000 compared with less than $9,000,000,000 in
1939. But, says C.E.D. "the very magnitude of the pros-
pective tax load after the war demands an attitude of bold-
ness in our fiscal planning". Hence they aim to balance the
budget only when the economy is balanced first.
C.E.D thinks full emnlovment can be attained and
in fact surpassed within ten vears. Until it is attained C.
E.D ! S key tax objective is to encourage new production and
1.
employment by letting business expand.
If business is to expand, a problem that must be
tackled is the double taxation on corporate income. Un<jer
the present tax system a corporation* s earnings are taxed
once when they show up on the corporation 1 s books and again
when thev are paid out to the shareholders. Tv,is puts a dam-
per on equity investment and discourages risk taking, which
means it may easily throw a wrench in the plans for employ-
ment and production in the years to follow.
Corporations want their taxes reduced for three
2.
main reasons :
a. thev say corporate taxes are a heayy business
1. Life, September 18, 1944, p. 30
2. New Republic, Op. cit., p. 417
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cost and discourages investment and employ-
ment •
b. elimination of corporate income taxes is
urged because they result in double taxa-
tion, Taxes on corporations double the taxes
that large numbers of small taxpayers who
receive corporate income must pay, since
they pay taxes on their income as corpora-
tion earnings and also as personal income.
They reduce purchasing nower by cutting down
the incomes of thousands of small stockholders.
c. they interfer with business judgement, *n
attempting to avoid corporate taxes, business
policies concerning expenditures, capital trans-
actions, and pricing may be distorted.
The only sound criticism of this let-us in cor-
porate tax is the fear that the corporate managers and
stockholders will not respond to the new incentive, T^ey
may hoard their profits instead of investing them, T^ey
mav not raise wages or lower prices, or even pay out their
profits in dividends.
Yet the whole fear of corporate hoarding may be
due for sharp revision. Over savings are considered nothing
but under investments. The war has proven that government
spending creates employment when the government can think
of enough things to buy. But neither the w ar nor the 1930
!
s
proved anything about the possibilities of private expan-
sion when the public starts thinking * out the things it
wants to buy, and aggresive business starts anticipating
' 1.
its desires.
Gradual reductions in individual income taxes will
1. Life, September IB, 1944, p. 30
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be made over a period of years. Rates will be trimmed all
along the scale but the biggest reductions will be at the
top and at the bottom. Personal exemptions, which have
been hammered down to $500. a person, will be boosted cau-
tiously. Exemptions will remain low throughout the fore-
seeable future, however, for to meet demands of the post-
war period the tax system must have a broad base, Even
raising the personal exemption from $500 to $750 would take
about $13,000,000,000 out of the present tax base and wru Id
1.
cut revenues about #2,500,000,000 a year.
Hence with dependence on individuals rather than
corporate taxes for at least one half of all federal revenues
the following tabulation was made for a national budget total-
ing $18,000,000,000. *
2.
TABLE 7. NATIONAL BUDGET 0F$18. OOP. 000. 000
(in billi ons of dollars)
TAX SOURCE C. E. D. RUML-SONNE TWIN.CITY
Personal income 12,1 13.0 7.8
Corporate profite 0,9 1,0 5.0
Excises 2.9 3.0 4.0
Estates and gifts 0.9 0.5 0.5
Customs and miscellaneous 1.2 0.5 0.7
TOTALS 18.0 18.0 18.0
1« Business Week, August 4,
2. Ibid, September 9, 1944,
1945, p.
p. 16
120
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B. FIRST TAX REVISIONS
The first big reduction in Federal taxes since
1929 went into effect on January 1, 1946. Taxe s on all
individual incomes were reduced, but the country's corp-
orations, along with 12,000,000 persons of low incomes
who are to be excused entirely from Federal income taxes
we^e the principal beneficiaries.
The outstanding; features the repeal of the 85.7
percent excess profits tax on corporations. Including a re-
duction of the regular corporation income tax from 40 per-
cent for corporations with net profits over $50,000 and
other changes the law will lessen, in 1946, by $3,136,000,
1.
000 the Federal taxes that business will have to oav.
Reduction in taxes on the income of individuals
total $2,644,000,000. Decreases range from 7 percent on
$1,000,000 income to the comnlete elimination of layments
by persons w^ose taxes under the ore sent law fall below
the 3 percent normal tax levied on all new income over
$500.
The new law anolies the individual surtax ex-
emptions which are $500 for the taxpayer and $500 for each
dependent, to the normal tax. In addition to this an extra
5 oercent deduction in the normal tax is authorized and the
1. New York Times, January 1, 1946, p. 25
2. Ibid, p. 25

120.
first surtax brackets will be 17 percent instead of 20 per-
1.
cent •
Hence it can be seen that the government has tak-
en the first step toward its revision of tax policies to aid
business and also to put into consumers' hands more purchasing
power for the coming years.
Tax reduction is no magician's wand' and full employ-
ment will not be achieved by this method alone, Industry must
learn that profits can be made from low prices and full pro-
duction as well as from high prices and restricted outputs,
and that nrofits from a low-price policy are apt to be stead-
ier than those from high-orice policy, Tax policy can supple-
ment price policy in achieving full emplovment, but it can-
not replace it,
^n short, while taxation may affect employment,
the complete solution of the problem of full employment will
not be found in tax policies, *t is in fact the other way
round; full employment is the first essential to any satis-
2.
factory solution of the tax problem.
1. New York Times, January 1, 1946, p. 25
2. Newcomer, M, Survey Graphic, February 1945, p. 50
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CHAPTER IX
THE ATTAINMENT OF PULL EMPLOYMENT
A. FULL EMPLOYMENT
Without doubt the government will have a great
deal to do with the final attainment of full employment.
The much fought over Full Employment B ill or MUrray-Pat-
nam Bin was introduced to give the government's guaran-
tee to all the oeople in America that they will set work
when they want work.
The Bin s preamble says that it wi 11 *
a. promote the general welfare of the nation
b. raise the standard of living of the
American people.
c. fasten and protect the American home and
the American family and the foundation of the
American* way of life.
d. provide adequate employment opportunities
for returning veterans
e. contribute to the full utilizati6n of our
national resources.
f. develop trade and commerce among the several
states and with foreign nations.
g. preserve and strengthen competitive private
enterprise, particularly small business enter-
prises.
h. strengthen the national defense and security.
i. contribute to the establishment and mainten-
ance of lasting peace among nations it is essen-
tial to that continuing full employment be main-
tained in the U.S.
1. Moley, R., Newsweek, June IB, 1945, p. 112
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The body of the bill as originally introduced
provided that the president in January of each year submit
to Congress a national budget giving the following 1 (a) the
total number of persons in the country who would want to
work during the twelve months oeriod starting the following
July; (b ) the afrerregate amount which all persons, all organ-
izations, and all branches of the government would spend and
invest during that twelve months period; (c) the aggregate
amount of such spending and investing, or gross national
product, that there must be in order to provide -fobs for all
who want to work; (d) a program of legislation and of gov-
ernment spending and investing wMch will eliminate any de-
ficiency in the cross national product needed for full emplo
1.
ment •
The original bill then placed the responsibility
for full employment squarely upon the government and pro-
vided a clear-cut mechanistic proceedure, bv which it would
fulfill this responsibility. And since by this proceedure,
it was assumed that it could be told beforehand just how
much the government must spend in order to assure full em-
ployment, such spending need not wait until unemployment
developed, but on the contrary would be made according to
schedule on the basis of the crovernment estimate. In other
words the spending was to be in anticipation of unemployment
not for the elimination of unemployment, *t was this mechan-
1. Newsweek, October 8, 1945, p. 48
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istic procedure and this anticioatory spending which were
1
the bases of criticism.
The bill as it came out of the Senate Committee
made the government still responsible for providing full em-
ployment and added that there should be jobs not only for
those able to work but for all those desirious of work. But
there was this important change. Instead of the mechanistic
procedure mentioned earlier a national budget is called for
in which the president is to estimate, in January of each
year, for the following fiscal year what it looks like, the
foreseeable trends in the way of employment, production,
spending, and investment, and then what the labor force will
be and out of this give a general program which will assure
2
full employment.
It also added that any spending and investing by
the government to create employment must be consistent with
the needs and obligations of the Federal government and
other essential considerations of the national policy. It
put in a provision requiring that any proposal for govern-
ment spending or investing after July 1, 1947 shall be ac-
companied by a program of taxation designed and calculated
to prevent any new increase in the national debt over a
3
reasonable period.
The Full Employment Act of 1946 as passed by both
1. Newsweek, October 8, 1945, p. 78
2. Robey, R
. ,
Op. cit., p. 124
3. Newsweek, Op. cit., p. 78
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houses of Congress in March 1946 provided for an economic
"brain trust" called the Council of Economic Advisers to
1.
the President. under this act the President makes an ec-
onomic report to Congress but this act does not provide
for a public works program to create lobs. However, if the
President should at some future date report to Congress
that a public works program is needed to create *obs then
Congress would decide whether to appropriate funds for the
2.
program •
Senator Philip ^-urrav in defending his original
3.
bill said its basic purposes were •
a. to maintain a continuous study of our nati-
onal economy so as to get advance warning of
impending unemployment.
b. to locate where possible the causes of such
pending unemployment and to remove the obstruct-
ions where they exist by reason of government
policies or proceedures.
c. to assist and stimulate private enterprise
so that it may be able to continue full employ-
ment .
d. to make such government expenditures as may
aid private enterprise to continue full employ-
ment
e. to cover any deficiency in employment, if
any, remaining after all employment possible
has been provided through steps one to four
inclusive by inaugurating public works to
provide the additional employment required
but such public works are limited to those
that add to the national economy, and well
1.
Senior Scholastics, Karch 4, 1946, p. 11
2. United States New s, March l, 1946, p. 37
3. Murray, P., American City, September 1945, p. 5
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being and must be let to private contractors.
Public works whose pr5.mary purpose is the
creation of ^obs are not authorized under this
bill.
f. the government is not authorized to operate
any production facilities and the bill contains
no provisions for regimenting or managing pri-
vate enterprise. Private enterprise is assisted
and encouraged but it is left completely free to
exercise its own ingenuity and initiative, wMch
are the qualities that have made this country
great.
Senator Murray says that his idea is not merely
that work shall be created through apnrooriati ons of public
funds to keeo people from starving on $52.00 a month on
W.P.A. "We are dealing with new wealth created by an app-
lication of skill, intelligence, and energy in such volume
that really substantial fruits of victory will spread th-
1.
roughout the world,' says Senator Phillip Murray.
President Harry Truman, in turn, says that full
employment legislation is essential. A s he sees it, "^e must
look first and foremost to private enterprise." But he
states that the ultimate duty of government is to use public
resources if other methods fail to prevent prolonged unem-
ployment. Such a positive role must be accompanied by defi-
nite assurances designed to maintain business confidences.
To his mind these should include • (a) assurance that all the
facts about full employment and opportunities will be gather-
ed periodically for the use of all. (b ) assurance of stabili-
1. %rray, P., Survey Grapbic, October 1945, p. 393
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ty and consistency in public policy, so that enterprise
can plan better and by knowing what the governemnt intends
to do: (c) assurance that every governmental police and
program will be pointed to promote maximum products and em-
ployment in private enterprises : (d) assurance that priority
will be g'ven to doing those things wMch stimulate normal
1.
employment most.
However, the act has many drawbacks. 1-n the first
place it will not ^ive full employment as there is nothing
in the bill that will halp us have full employment. *n pass-
ing this bill and calling it a full employment act when it
is not true would be misrepresentation. Millions of oeoole
in this country will assume that the U.S. Government now
has accepted the responsibility to give them full employ-
ment and the bill does not do this.
A second major defect of the bill is that by call-
ing it a full employment act Congress will be less inclined
to do some of the things that are necessary. This bill then
by warding off necessary legislation will tend to create
unemployment , not provide full employment.
Thirdly the bill is dealing onlv in slogans. Wh&t
we need is not a full emplopi.ent act but a full employment
program because there is no single bill which can solve the
2.
problem of this country today.
The question the public should also ask about the
1. Haber, H., Surve y Graphic, °ctober 1945, p. 418
2. Robey, R., 0o . c it., p. 124
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full employment bill relates first to its extraordinary
reliance on governemnt forecasting, and secondly, to its
statement of implied economic policy.
Will the government be able to predict the course
1.
of the economy as a whole? Since the underlying assumption
of the bill is that it is the gross national product which
determines the number of lobs, a 1 percent error in estimat-
ing the labor force would mean a 1 percent error in the
amount which the government says is necessary to provide full
employment. That 1 percent error in the needed gross national
product would mean approximately $2,000,000,000 which is
2.
some 1600,000 for every family in the United °tates.
However, passage of the full employment bill is a
legal acknowledgement that the national government assumes
responsibility for prosperity in peacetime. But, of course,
the bill does not either bring full employment or say how
the new high standard of living shall be maintained. *t is
a declaration of intention and a provision of the means to
3.
start a 1ob. With its passage it affords a framework for
blocking out a program in cooperation with industry, agri-
culture, labor, state and local governments, by which the
federal government would assure full employment. Tv,is program
must stimulate private enterprise to provide the largest
volume of employment opoortunities . If they, in turn, are
1. Fortune, A^ril 1945, p. 106
2. Robev, R., Newsweek, July 9, 1945, p. 72
5. KUnray, P., Survey Graphic, On. cit., p. 397
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insufficient to assure this full employment, the federal
government is to provide sufficient volume of federal in-
1.
vestment and expenditure to assure the employment.
Hence this bill is based uoon the theory that no
single group in the country, either industry, labor, or ag-
riculture can by itself assure the expanding markets which
are necessary for full porduction and full employment. The
bill recognizes the fact that only the government acting in
cooperation with industry, labor, agriculture, and state
and localities can assume a continuing level of demand
sufficient to absorb the ^oods and services produced under
our modern economic conditions. *t is, therefore, based
upon the principle that we cannot have full employment with-
out full production and that the key to maintaining full
2,
production is full comsumption.
However, in spite of the fact that these principles
upon which the bill is based are real, still the bill does
not erive us the answer to the assurance of these principles.
It is true that we will need federal aid to assure full
employment but the Full Employment * s only a declara-
tion of intention without a program of action which will
be needed.
1. Survey Graphic, °ctober 194.% p. 395
2. Murray, J«E., Congressional Digest, October 1945, p. 227
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B. FEDERAL BUDGET
The component parts of the national economy, which
together give the total outlays that constitute the damand
for goods and services as a whole are outlays by* (a) pri-
vate consumers for consumer goods and services; (b ) business
whether corporation, partnership or individuals for capital
goods (plants, equipment, inventories, houses, foreign in-
vestment); (c) by state and local governments for current
governmental services find nublic works and improvement
projects; (d) by the federal government for current serv-
ices and public improvements. 0n the other side, the total
receipts of the various economic groups in the economy are
disposed of as follows : (a) consumption outlays; (b) savings
;
1.
(c) taxes.
If by 1950 under full employment 60,000,000 per-
sons in the U.S. will be producing and consuming $200, 000,
000. 000 worth of goods and services a year at 1944 prices,
how much of this amount should he contributed by the federal
government? ^ow much will be contributed by city and state
governments, by consumers, by businesses?
Since government, business, and individual con-
sumers all frequently tend to buy less than they would like
to sell, it is easy for the national budget to be out of
balance at the desired condition of full employment. Against
1. Euiau
,
H., New Republic, September 24, 1945, p. 398
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the estimate that $170, 000, 000, 000 at 1941 prices of gross
national products are estimated (at wartime tax rates and
1.
orewar savings habits) to fall short by $20,800,000,000.
The biggest part of this deficit is traceable to
the fact that the government with its tax schedules takes
in $17,900,000,000 more ourchasing power than it pays out.
But if taxes are cut to the point where the government
would have about a $2, 000, 000, 000 surplus, there would still
be a deficit of about $8,500,000,000. The National Planning
Board then sets up budgets for three ways of doing away with
this deficit, namely by : (a) greater government spending;
(b ) new investment in business; (c) greater consumer spend-
ing.
However, each has its difficulties and drawbacks.
If the government tried to do the lob it could never bal-
ance its own budget and would have to spend on a scale that
would bring an end to our free enterprise economy. If busi-
ness tried to do the .lob by expansion, it could do so only
temporarily on the basis of a high boom, reminiscent of 1929.
If consumers tried to do the *ob, their habits and distribu-
2.
tion of wealth would have to be very much chanced.
Hence to balance the budget by the right amount
of spending by consumer, business, and erovernment will re-
quire the highest qualitv of national statesmanship and
1. Time, April 30, 1945, p. 78
2. Ibid, 0P# cit., p. 78
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demand for leaders in government, business, and labor,
We may get the greatest progress if we aim to have
consumers sunnlv about two thirds of the $200,000,000,000 of
1.
national expenditures.
^any estimates have been made as to the amount of
spending business, consumers, and government must do to give
us a balanced budget, nlus 60,000,000 jobs and a national
income of $200,000,000,000 by 1950. T^e following table shows
some of the models •
TABLE 8. NATIONAL BUDGET FOR 60.000.000 JOBS
(billion dollars)
NATIONAL BUDGETS CONSUMERS BUSINESS GOV'T TOTALS
i (actual) 71 18 11 100
(actual) 97 3 98 198
i Models (1944 prices)
Government model 120 15 65 200
Business model 130 35 35 200
Consumer model 140 25 35 200
Consumer-business model 135 30 35 200
These forms of the national budget are only pre-
liminary samples. The w^ole idea is new and still rapidly
developing. However, the wisdom shown in determining how
much each group will have to spend in 1950 for full employ-
ment will have much to do with determining whether we are
1. Wanace, Henry
,
Op. cit., p. 68
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to have full employment or mass unemployment all over
again.
C. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Private enterprise must take the leading role in
guaranteeing full employment. Our chances are excellent for
attaining high employment with high productivity under pri-
vate industrial enterprises. We came within reasonable dis-
tance of it in 1929 and the conditions are even more favor-
able now. The unsolved oroblem in 1929 and the years that
follow the end of World »W ii will be to maintain the high
1.
level.
The economy in 1946 and for some years to come may
be called a "catching-up" economy, because the demand for
goods will be based upon the large needs that have grown out
of the war. Many of the catching up demands, however, will
be temporary, and this factor may introduce violent fluct-
2.
uations in production and employment.
Production of civilian goods was cut down to the
vanishing point and inventories dwindled to odds and ends
during the years 1939-1945. With rationing relaxed, it is
anticipated that food consumption will increase from one
third to one Half along with similar .lumps in the purchase
of s^oes, hats, and clothing. Tnere are also the billions
that will be spent for radio sets, new cars, home furnish-
1. Flanders, R.E., N.Y. Times MagaZ ine , Nov# i 8) 1945, p.
8
2. Siichter, G., Collier s, July 3, 1943, p. 32
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ings> and even low-priced planes.
Almost every line of business will be in the mar-
ket for replacement as a result of war curtailment. Rail-
roads will need new locomotives, rails, passenger and freight
cars. Factories and farms now held down to less than one half
their essential needs, will be in great need for new machin-
1.
ery.
However, we must face the fact that capitalist pro-
duction is subject to temporary expansion and contraction
and that all labor available cannot be employed all the time
or there would be few solvent institutions left in this
country. T0 assume full employment by industry is to assume
the impossible — perfect judgement on the part of producers,
no mistakes by entrepreneurs, a balanced relationship be-
tween supply and demand at every moment in every commodity,
no change overs for product improvement causing temporary
unemployment, a theoretical right level for the wages of
labor, prices gauged to hairbreath accuracy in order to sell
all the output all the time. These are only a few of the turn-
ing factors which must add up to 100 percent in order to
produce continual 100 percent employment. *f it is impossible
for industry to solve all the problems and bear all the costs
incident to full employment, government will have to step in
and help industry continue production.
1. Creel, G. Collier's, July 3, 1943, p. 32
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We must realize first that the key to maximum
employment under orivate capitalism is greater production
and continued expansion of industry, competition in all
phases of business which is the basis of a healthy, vital
1.
economy and a high level of employment.
The one responsibility of management is that is
should use its adequate resources now both skillfully and
energetically. It should exploit its opportunities, do as
much business, make as much money as legitimately it can.
The task of business is to search for profits, cheaper
2.
goods, and more i*obs.
It is clearly up to business to oroduce every-
thing for consumer pent-up demand backed by their savings
so that we will have an expanded economy that will give
us full employment.
Management must learn to pay their employees
reasonable wages and government must make the tax burden
lower on the low-income group so they will have the pur-
chasing power to buy the products that business will put
on the market.
Again we must educate our public to spend be-
cause it is only in spending that we will keep business
on a high level. People need things now and the oroduction
of goods should be so stretched that this demand will
1. Fertig, L., Imerican Mercury, February 1944, p. 221
2. Fortune, On. c it., p. 106
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continue for many good years.
At this ooint somebody always rises to say that
there is a limit to the number of houses, automobiles,
electric ice boxes, and other accessories that people can
use. But never have we tried to make it possible for people
in the lower income group to buy the products of American
industry. *t is only bv putting more monev into the hands
of this group of oeoole that we will be able to keep our
domestic market somewhat stable.
Will we have iobs for everyone? There will be a
great tussle, and to win the struggle will depend unon the
degree of cooperation between business and government, the
willingness of the public to work, to spend, and to take
the poor times along with the good times.
Industry must contribute ingenuity, courage, re-
sourcefulness, Government must answer with a favorable tax
and political climate. It will be hard at times and it may
seem a futile fight at times, too. But this will be the
test of the svstem upon wMcb our greatness rests. A job
when interpreted that way, is so important that no amount
of trying is too much.
The full employment problem is a challenge to de-
mocracy. It is a challenge to get full production, preserve
the fundamental freedoms, and then go forward toward objec-
tives which are worthy of man's spirit.
America has never shirked a challenge before. It
will not shirk this one. It is the land of plenty, the land

upon which so much denends; therefore it must provide for
its people, who work to keep it great, the i*obs that mean
their livelihood and consequently their happiness. It is
a trust given to us by &o&; a trust that America will not
betray.
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